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To force an end to the seemingly interminable war with Sparta, 
Lysistrata, the title character in Aristophanes' comedy, exhorts the 
women of Athens to achieve peace by arousing their husbands' desires 
while refusing them any gratification. This political act would force the 
men to end the war: "[d]oesnlt matter what they threaten to do - even 
if they try to set fire to the place - they won't make us open the gates 
except on our own terms."' 
Two thousand three hundred years later, democracy and gender still 
have a tortured relationship. Although most democracies provided 
women with the right to vote and stand for office long ago, in most 
countries, democracy means government by, and possibly for, men. The 
United States' gendered political system is typical2 - eighty-five years 
after women won the right to vote, they constitute less than one-fifth of 
Associate Professor, Pace Law School. B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1991; J.D., 
University of Pennsylvania, 1995. First, my deepest thanks to Angela I. Onwuachi-Willig 
for organizing this exciting symposium and for including me in this fabulous community. 
For their enormously helpful comments and conversations, I thank Laura I. Appleman, 
Bridget J. Crawford, David B. Cruz, Adrienne Dale Davis, Don Doemberg, L'ida C. 
Fentiman, James J. Fishman, Sheila R. Foster, Michelline Gallabert, Franvoise Gaspard, 
Bennett L. Gershman, Lissa Griffin, Janet A. Johnson, Sonia K. Katyal, Susan P. Sturm, and 
Gay1 S. Westerman. Thanks also to Meredith A. Aheme, Courtney E. Lotfi, Mousa Zalta, 
Veronique A. Hodeau, Melody Mathews, and Michael Schwarz for research assistance. 
' ARISTOPHANES, LYSISTRATA 189 (Alan Somrnerstein trans., Penguin Books 1973). 
The text is quite explicit about the arousing of the men's desires: "Well, just imagine: 
we're at home, beautifully made up, wearing our sheerest . . . neglige& and nothing 
underneath, and with our triangles carefully plucked; and the men are all like ramrods and 
can't wait to leap into bed, and then we absolutely refuse - that'll make them make peace 
soon enough, you'll see." JOHN STOLTENBERG, EFUSING TO BE A MAN 28 (1989). Scientists 
generally agree that there are seven gender traits that constitute one. Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003). "We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences 
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today." Id. These seven 
variables classify the distinct elements of gender identity: 1) Chromosomes; 2) Gonads; 3) 
Hormones; 4) Internal reproductive organs; 5) External genitalia; 6) Secondary sexual 
characteristics; and 7) Self identity. Douglas K. Smith, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment 
Surgery and the Law, 56 CORNELL . REV. 963,972 (1971). Fifteen years later, the New York 
Supreme Court of New York County used the exact formulation cited above in Maffei v. 
Kolaeton Industries, Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that pre-operative 
transgendered female was protected by New York City's sex discrimination statute as 
member of class of males). See Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why  Male and Female 
Are Not Enough, S~I. ,  Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 21 (promoting notion of multiple gender factors). 
Carolina Rodriguez Bello, Women and Political Representation: Facts and Figures, Nov. 
2003, http://www.whmet.org/docs/issue-women-politics.html#Facts. This level of 
representation is similar to that in the United States, many European countries, and Japan. 
Certain countries, such as those in Scandinavia, as well as those which have adopted Parity 
provisions, have more, even significantly more, than this level. 
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elected representatives.3 Women occupy few political offices, not merely 
in one nation, but around the world. 
To combat this electoral gender inequalityI4 various democracies5 with 
the support of international organizations, have adopted quota 
requirements for legislatures or political ensuring that women 
actually participate in politics, rather than play the role of "a few tokens 
in political life."7 Scanning women's representation worldwide, 
Scandinavian countries have levels generally above 40%' Ireland 
enacted a quota that requires parties select women to fill 40% of 
' Women make up 51.1% of the national populous, but only 15.5% of the House of 
Representatives and 14% of the Senate. MILDRED L. AMER, CONG. RES. SERVICE REP. FOR 
CONG., MEMBERSHIP OF THE 1 0 9 ~ ~  CONGRESS: A PROFILE 5 (2004), available at 
http://~c.state.gov/documents/organization/40873.pdf. 
' Here, I use the term "electoral gender inequality" to refer to the gendered nature of 
elected offices given the wide gap between men and women. 
The term deployed in France and other countries is referred to as "quotas" in Brazil, 
possibly because the program in Brazil did not incorporate a full level of equality, and 
possibly because the term "quota" has a distinctly negative meaning in other languages. 
Through the UN's Decade of Women, beginning in Mexico City in 1975 and ending in 
Nairobi in 1985, a program was designed to promote a plan for gender equality and full 
participation of women in political entities and the peace making process. The Suzanne 
Mubarak Women's International Peace Movement Homepage, http://www.womenfor 
peaceinternational.org/News/UNFile.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2005). The Global 
Database of Quotas for Women is a joint project of the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance ("International IDEA") and Stockholm University. 
Int'l IDEA, Global Database of Quotas for Women, About the Project, 
http://www.quotaproject.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). The project was created as a way 
of exploring the obstacles to the political participation of women through the world. Id. at 
http://www.quotaproject.org/about.cfm [hereinafter About the Project] (taking into 
account social and economic regimes of countries, as well as their different political 
structures, to obtain greater insight into levels of women representation in world, 
specifically through analyzing use of quotas). 
About the Project, supra note 5. The four most common quotas for women's 
representation are: (1) Constitutional Quota for National Parliament; (2) Election Law 
Quota or Regulation for National Parliament; (3) Political Party Quota for Electoral 
Candidates; and (4) Constitutional or Legislative Quota for Sub-National Government. 
' Int'l IDEA, Global Database for Women, About Quotas, http://www.quota 
project.org /aboutquotas.cfm (last visited Feb. 7,2006). 
Mary Becker, Essay, The Sixties' Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument 
for Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. &MARY L. REV. 209,269 (1998). Sweden leads the world 
with the highest proportion of women in parliament: 40.4%. This result was achieved by a 
commitment from the five leading political parties that women and men alternate positions 
on party lists. Finland's parties adopted a 40% quota for women in 1995, and political 
parties in Norway regularly field 50% women candidates either by tradition or party rules. 
Norway, Spain, and the Netherlands have roughly 36% of their government comprised of 
women. Rwanda also has a very high proportion of women in govenunent, in excess of its 
quota of 30%, in part due to the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. 
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candida~ies.~ Simultaneously, other democracies, such as ~ r ~ e n t i n a "  
and ~razil" also adopted quota laws, albeit with limited enforcement. 
Despite these apparent successes, most countries have extremely low 
levels of female representation - with the lowest levels in countries with 
Islamic governments.12 
France had the most assertive response to electoral gender inequality, 
enacting the Parity Law ("Parity") in 2000. Parity amended the French 
Constitution to require that political parties select women as half of their 
candidates for public office.13 French parties have to field women 
candidates or face fines or exclusion from the ballot.14 The United States, 
in contrast, maintains a steadfast refusal to debate issues of women's 
representation. It is surprising, then, that the United States placed a 
quota for women's representation in the draft constitution for the 
Republic of 1raq.15 Chapter Four, Article 30 (C) of the Iraqi Constitution 
states that "[tlhe electoral law shall aim to achieve the goal of having 
women constitute no less than one-quarter of the members of the 
WNIA MALHEIROS MIGUEL, POL~TICA DE COTAS POR SEXO 21 (2000); Becker, supra 
note 8, at 268. 
lo About the Project, supra note 5; see Maria Jose Lubertino, Pioneering Quotas: The 
Argentine Experience and Beyond, http://www.quotaproject.org/CS/CS~Lubertino~27-11- 
2003.pdf (last visited Sept. 21,2005). 
" Becker, supra note 8, at 268; see also Clara Araujo, Mulheres e Representacao Politica: A 
Experiencia das Cotas no Brasil [Women and Political Representation: The Quotas Experiment in 
Brazil], in 6 REVISTA ESTUWS FEMINISTAS 71-90 (1998); Mala N. Htun, Mujeres y Poder 
Politico en Latinoam'rica, in MUJERES EN EL PARLAMENTO: MAS ALLA DE LOS NUMEROS, 19-44 
(Myriam Mend&-Montalvo & Julie Ballington eds., 2002). Although Brazil's size and racial 
diversity would serve as an interesting comparison to the United States, its quota law has 
few enforcement mechanisms. To the extent that quota laws, such as Brazil's, involve "soft 
law" mechanisms, they may provide an interesting contrast to a relatively "hard law" such 
as Parity. 
I* Int'l IDEA, Global Database of Quotas for Women, http://www.quotaproject.org/ 
country.cfm?SortOrder=electoralSystem (last visited Nov. 28, 2005). Egypt also has an 
extremely low amount of women's participation, with only 11 out of 454 seats occupied by 
women (2.4%). In Algeria the amount of women in politics is only 6.2%, a mere 24 seats 
out of 389. Tunisia has a somewhat better showing of women in government with 21 out of 
182 seats filled by women (11.5%). Pakistan has a high number of women involved in 
politics with 72 of 214 seats filled by women (21.1%). 
l3 Law No. 99-569 of July 8, 1999, Journal Officiel de la Rkpublique Francaise U.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], July 9, 1999, p. 10175, available at http://www.legifrance. 
gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheExperteJorf.jsp (retrieve text by law number) . 
l4 See Law No. 2000-493 of June 6, 2000, Journal Officiel de la Rkpublique Francaise 
U.O.] [Official Gazette of France], June 7, 2000, p. 8560, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheExperteJorf.jsp (retrieve text by law 
number); Effets directs et indirects de la loi du 6 juin 2000: un Bilan Contrastk, 
http:/ /www.observatoire-parite.gouv.fr/travaux/rapport~08/rapport~2005.pdf. 
l5 Quota, in this case, includes the broader category of goals. See infra Part I.B. 
Heinonline - -  3 9  U . C .  Davis L. Rev. 1123 2 0 0 5 - 2 0 0 6  
1124 University of California, Davis [Vol. 39:1119 
National ~ s s e m b l ~ . " ' ~  Drafters insisted on this provision, fearing that: 
"if women are frozen out of a nascent Iraqi overnment, their chances of F breaking through later are slim to none." Apparently, even to the 
current United States administration, gender does matter in democracy.1s 
This Article seeks to situate remedies for electoral gender inequality in 
the context of liberal democratic theory. This Article does not attempt to 
present a complete argument for the existence of electoral gender 
inequality. However, it does presume that gender inequality, in 
particular electoral gender inequality, raises fundamental questions. 
Essentialism, the metaphysical theory that an object or person's 
essential properties can be distinguished from those that are incidental to 
it, or learned, has served as a third-rail for feminist theory for decades, as 
scholars and activists debate whether certain traits may be ascribed to 
women. Essentialist theory has found ample support in French 
fe~ninisrn.'~ To institute a quota, it would appear that one must assume 
"woman" means something different from "man," and that women, as a 
l b  LAW OF ADMINISTRATION F R THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD ch. 4, 
art. 30, 5 C (2004), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html 
[hereinafter TRANSITIONAL DMINISTRATION F IRAQ] (emphasis added) (propagated by 
Coalition Provisional Authority in March of that year). 
" Swanee Hunt & Cristina Posa, Iraq's Excluded Women,  FOREIGN POL'Y, July-Aug. 
2004, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story~id=258O&page=O. 
On January 30,2005,86 women won seats on Iraq's National Assembly, constituting 31% of 
elected officials. This number exceeded the goal of 25% of women representation, stated in 
the March 8, 2004 Transitional Administrative Law. TRANS~IONAL DMINISTRATION OF 
IRAQ, supra note 16. Many argue success of women representatives is a result of this "1 of 
3" quota initiative. The National Assembly's main objectives are to draft a Constitution, 
appoint national leaders and promote legislation. ELISABETH REHN & ELLEN JOHNSON 
SIRLEAF, WOMEN, WAR AND PEACE (2002), http://www.womenwarpeace.org/ iraq/ 
iraq.htm (linking to the Independent Experts Assessment on the Impact on Armed Conflict 
on Women). The newly elected Iraqi government also has an increased representation of 
women in appointed positions. On May 3, 2005, twenty-nine women were sworn into 
posts such as Minister of Culture, Minister of Environment and Acting Minister for Human 
Rights. Id. 
l8  REHN & JOHNSON, supra note 17. Although popular support exists for women's 
rights, immediate political representation alone can ensure the long-term goals of 
educational programs, job-skills training, and rights awareness. Id. Architects of the new 
Iraq are concerned that involving women in politics may become "considerably more 
difficult after United States forces entrench conservative religious clerics and tribal leaders 
in positions of power." Id. In fact, vocal minorities have and continue to thwart the 
representation of women in Iraq. Id. Women's representation, some believe, can even 
"provide Iraq with a stabilizing force needed to stave off the potentially disastrous division 
of the country into ethnic states." Id. In this vision, Iraqi women might unite for equality 
within their country, overriding political and economic differences among them, furthering 
a greater societal stability. Id. 
'' Scholars such as Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous surface as the most prominent of 
these theorists. 
Heinonline - -  39 U . C .  Davis L. Rev. 1 1 2 4  2 0 0 5 - 2 0 0 6  
class, differ from men. Separating essentialism from quotas, this Article 
suggests that fluid remedies for group inequality may serve the anti- 
essentialist normative goals of anti-subordination. 
Women's quotas do not necessarily depend on an essential identity of 
women.20 An anti-subordination argument would emphasize women's 
exclusion from significant levels of political power, and argue that 
quotas of some sort, for some duration, are necessary to reverse this 
equality.21 This Article draws on the contrast between France and the 
United States to inquire how democracy and identity, gender identity in 
particular, relate to each other. An appropriately fluid remedy for 
electoral gender inequality would adhere to the tradition of United 
States group inequality remedies, remedies which already coexist with 
neutrality principles. 
Part I examines Parity's strangeness to United States observers. 
United States sex discrimination law ignores political representation 
issues. United States voting rights law contains no provisions for gender 
inequality. Most importantly, leading United States thinkers of all 
stripes roundly reject quotas. 
Part I1 details the Parity debate and its relationship to French 
democracy. The democracies of the United States and of France share 
Eighteenth Century Enlightenment origins. They also share some form 
of universalism (labeled "neutrality" in the United States by Cass 
sunstein)= establishing the equality of all citizens before the law. Parity 
20 ANNE PHILLIPS, POLITICS OF PRESENCE 168 (1995). 
'' Jane Mansbridge, The Descriptive Political Representation of Gender: An  Anti- 
Essentialist Argument, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN? ASSURING EQUAL 
REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 19 (Sytte Klausen & Charles S. Maier 
eds., 2001) [hereinafter HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN?]. 
22 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Neutralify in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference 
to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992). "Neutrality" as 
predominantly defined, is believed to be of natural origin and therefore just. Id. Sunstein, 
however, finds this "baseline" belief incorrect because the notion of what is neutral is 
instead a culmination of old biases and stereotypes. Id. at 3-4. The notion of "equality" 
cannot be detached from references to old values and distributions because the concept is 
dependent upon how the govenunent normally ensures "equality" rather than how it 
should be accomplished. Id. at 6-9. Sunstein argues that the baseline of determining what 
is neutral arises from what is considered "natural," and what is natural, originates in what 
the government normally does. In order to make change, the baseline of neutrality, in a 
constitutional context, must be adjusted through a substantive debate that is not reliant 
upon what is considered "natural." Id. at 13. 
In particular, women are discriminated by legal rules that are based on male norms. 
Id. at 2. Sexual inequality is largely a consequence of women's reproductive capacity. 
Legal practices have relied on the social norm to justify inequality in the workplace where 
women are discriminated in job placement and advancement because of the traditional 
notion of women being the caretakers and men being the breadwinners. Id. at 16. 
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serves as a good counterpoint to the United States because of similarities 
between the French and U.S. democracies. Parity aims to reflect a 
gendered democracy, not institute a quota.23 France's universalism 
refuses even the acknowledgement of the existence of racial, ethnic, or 
religious minorities, even at the cost of inflaming ethnic ineq~alities.'~ 
These elements of France's conceptualization of the relationship between 
democracy and identity (gender or racial), stimulate a revisiting of the 
quota debate here. 
Part I11 turns back to the United States. The United States and France 
share a fundamental respect for the neutrality of the state with regard to 
group rights. Parity affords a fresh perspective on the relationship 
between remedies for group inequality and the neutrality of the state. 
Inserting fluidity into quotas provides an anti-essentialist method to 
situate remedies for group inequality within the context of the neutral 
state.25 United States jurisprudence already incorporates some fluidity. 
Reviewing electoral gender inequality in light of these arguments allows 
us to revisit descriptive representation, based on the identity of the voter, 
and interest representation, based on the ideas of the voter.26 Revisiting 
descriptive representation suggests that remedies for electoral gender 
inequality may not foster essentialism or violate neutrality. Parity may 
not be the right remedy for the United States, but some remedy is 
required. Instead of relying on dualistic notions that men and women 
Moreover the physical capacities of men are used as the baseline to determine the 
treatment of women, instead of changing the baseline to view women in their own context. 
Id. at 3. The issue of abortion concerns freedom from discrimination rather than a woman's 
right to privacy. Id. at 49. The norm is to view the situation from what society considers a 
woman's natural role, but this is a stereotype. Thus, the concept of neutrality allows the 
biological differences between men and women to transcend into the legal sphere of 
constitutional rights. Id. at 49-52. 
Joan Scott addresses the complexity of the Parity law and its relationship to other 
recent developments in French democracy. See Joan Wallach Scott, French Universalism in 
the Nineties, 15 DIFFERENCES: J.  OF FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 34,42 (2004). 
24 Many blame these inequalities for the riots that began in largely French-Arab and 
French-African suburbs of France on October 27, 2005. Mark Landler & Craig S. Smith, 
French Officials Try to Ease Fear as Crisis Swells, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,2005, at Al; see infra Part 
II.B on French universalism. 
Liberal in this Article references liberal democratic theory, not the more popular use 
of "liberal" as opposed to "conservative." Mansbridge, supra note 21, at 30. 
. . 
26 "Interest representation" occurs when a representative advocates for the interests of 
a body of voters. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L . REV. 
1413,1462 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, No Two Seats]. In contrast to interest representation, 
"descriptive representation" occurs when a group is represented by one or more members 
of that group. Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of 
Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1102 n.114 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, 
Tokenism]. 
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should possess equal political power, remedies should address the 
gendered nature of electoral power, including the political, as well as 
cultural, exclusion of women. 
Parity marks an enormous cultural and legal gulf between France and 
the United States, inviting comparative inquiry. Part I analyzes the 
reasons why Parity appears at first so outlandish to United States legal 
culture.27 Under United States jurisprudence, gender-based rights and 
electoral rights are mutually exclusive. That is, sex discrimination law 
has never incorporated voting rights, and voting rights law has excluded 
consideration of gender-based rights. Quotas arouse a strong and broad 
aversion among both critical and liberal  thinker^.^' 
A. Parity, a Profoundly Foreign Concept 
Parity seems so very foreign due to the juxtaposition of two rarely 
joined areas of legal inquiry: political representation and gender. Sex 
discrimination and political representation law are mutually exclusive in 
the United States. 
1. Sex Discrimination, Not Representation 
Despite deep electoral gender inequality, sex discrimination theory has 
centered on employment and public accommodation, rather than 
electoral power. The two principal sources for sex discrimination law, 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964: do not 
27 This "foreign-ness" raises the question of comparative methodology. Comparative 
projects tend to select, implicitly or explicitly, subjects that involve difference between the 
legal culture of the observer's country and some element of that of the observed country. 
The fact that the comparison arises from the perception of difference raises the question of 
objectivity. 
" Critical thinkers such as Lani Guinier question quotas for an emphasis on 
descriptive representation; liberal thinkers such as Bruce Ackerman attack quotas as 
undermining the neutrality of the liberal state. 
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2005). Another potential source for antidiscrimination doctrine 
is the Nineteenth Amendment, as addressed by Reva Siegel. Her work on the Nineteenth 
Amendment persuasively revives the meaning of that Amendment, which, in concert with 
the Fourteenth Amendment, can place sex discriminahon law on its own ground, moving 
beyond the still-present dependence on race-based analogies. However, Siegel's work uses 
the Nineteenth Amendment to fortify the "negative" rights conception behind United 
States sex discrimination law. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment Sex, 
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 947-1046 (2002). For more 
discussion of Siegel's work with regard to women's representation, see infra Part 1II.D. 
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address electoral exclu~ion.~~ In addition, the United States' failure to 
pass the Equal Rights Amendment over two decades ago reflects a 
profound reluctance to realize some national project for gender 
equality.31 As one scholar put it, "although the United States sees itself 
as the world leader of sex equality, it has fallen behind other nations in 
its willingness to experiment with various ways to achieve electoral 
equality for women."32 In contrast, Parity demonstrates France's 
willingness to experiment. 
Sex discrimination law in the United States adheres to a vision of 
negative rights - the right to be free from sex discrimination, primarily 
in public accommodations and the workplace." The expansive theory 
and practice in these areas has achieved impressive results in a variety of 
areas of public and private life. However, sex discrimination law has not 
incorporated the positive rights that would include electoral equality. 
As a consequence, state intervention in gender inequality falls to 
preventing discrimination rather than promoting inclusion in the 
political process. Accordingly, affirmative action discourse in the United 
States centers on race-based remedies rather than gender-based 
remedies.34 Sex discrimination law evidences a blind spot toward a more 
See Becker, supra note 8, at 271. 
31 Joan A. Lukey &Jeffrey A. Smagula, Do We Still Need an Equal Rights Amendment?, 44 
BOSTON B.J. 10, 28 (2000) (concluding that equal rights amendment would "remove any 
instability and uncertainty regarding judicial protection of legal equality of women"). 
32 Id. 
3, To utilize the somewhat dated dichotomy of positive and negative rights that 
distinguished social democracies from liberal democracies, negative rights, typically 
described as rights to be free from state intervention, typify liberal democracy. Positive 
rights, such as the right to education or healthcare, arise in social democracies. 
" Another key area in which this analogy has thrived to the detriment of sex 
discrimination doctrine and an awareness of intersectional possibilities is affirmative 
action. United States affirmative action policies do apply to women, but women and the 
rectification of gender inequalities have had marginal import upon affirmative action 
discourse. The United States Supreme Court, despite several interventions into race-based 
affirmative action, only once squarely considered the legality of gender-based affirmative 
action programs. Even then, the Court did not explicitly address the constitutional 
dimensions of gender-based affirmative action, but conf~ned its discussion to the legitimacy 
of such programs under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Kendall Thomas, The 
Political Economy of Recognition: Afirmative Action Discourse and Constitutional Equality in 
Germany and the U.S.A., 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 329, 329-31 (1992). Thus, gender-based 
affirmative action programs find their support outside the more grounded foundations of 
race-based affirmative action. Affirmative action, however, is not a likely vehicle for the 
advancement of women's political representation in the United States, in contrast to France. 
In Britain, perhaps the most similar democracy to the United States, the Labor Party, has 
quotas requiring 40% women at all party levels and it ran women in 50% of the open or 
"winnable" seats, but this policy was struck by a court in a challenge from rejected male 
candidates who argued that it discriminated against men. See Gail Russell Chaddock, 
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expansive set of gender rights. 
2. Voting Rights Law and Gender 
Whereas in France, Parity targets electoral gender inequality, United 
States remedies centered on the dramatic exclusion of blacks from voting 
until the Civil Rights Movement succeeded in forcing passage of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the "vRA").~~ 
a. Political Representation Remedies Center on Race 
The passage of the Fifteenth Amendment gave blacks the right to vote 
in name alone.36 A century later, armed with the VRA, civil rights 
litigators enforced this basic right to vote in the first "generation" of 
votin ri hts litigation, removing barriers such as poll taxes and literacy 8 tests.3 Later, Congress also regulated districting to prevent structural 
limits on the voting potential of a racial or language minority.38 Section 2 
of the VRA institutes a formal process that empowers minorities to 
Quotas Boost Women Polls, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 14, 1997, at 1. Nevertheless, the 
number of women in the Parliament nearly doubled in the May 1, 1997 election. See id. 
The ruling came after some candidates had been slated and many local parties resented the 
ruling and selected women in spite of it. See id. 
35 See Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 1973 (1965). During discussion of the Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, the committee declined to add sex discrimination as an 
activity prohibited under section 2 of the VRA. The vote was 16-2. See S. REP. NO. 97-417 
(1982), available at 1982 WL 25033 (summarizing legislative history of Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982). 
36 Scott Gluck, Congressional Reaction to Iudicial Construction of Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965,29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 337,343 (1996). "[Iln the years between the 
ratification of the [Fifteenth] Amendment and passage of the Voting Rights Act, blacks 
were denied any real opportunity to register and vote throughout much of the United 
States, especially in the South." Gluck notes that at the time the Act was signed into effect 
the registration numbers for blacks in the South were remarkably low. In Georgia, over 
57% of all whites were registered, compared to only 25% of all voting age blacks; in 
Alabama, the percentage of whites registered to vote was 66.2%, compared to 18.5% of 
blacks; in Mississippi, the registration numbers were 66.1% for whites, while only 6.4% for 
blacks. Id. at 338 n.6 (citing Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the 
H. Comm. on the ludiciay, 89th Cong. 9, 32 tbl.B5 (1965)); see also South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966) ("[R]egistration of voting-age Negroes in Alabama 
rose only from 14.2% to 19.4% between 1958 and 1964; in Louisiana it barely inched ahead 
from 31.7% to 31.8% between 1956 and 1965; and in Mississippi it increased only from 4.4% 
to 6.4% between 1954 and 1964."). 
37 See 42 U.S.C. 5 1973(a) (prohibiting states from using "any voting qualification, or 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure" to deny or abridge black voting 
rights); see also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893-94 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(describing original VRA as intended to eradicate racial barriers to ballot access). 
38 42 U.S.C. 5 1973. 
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challenge VRA violations? while Section 5 details jurisdictions with 
discriminatory histories that require particular attention by the Justice 
~ e ~ a r t m e n t . *  
The Voting Rights Act specifically allows racial minorities4' to elect 
representatives of their choice," the enforcement of which inspired a 
"second generation" of voting rights litigation." After the VRA's success 
in permitting blacks to vote almost immediately,44 representation 
required additional efforts to thwart white majorities that regularly 
diluted black votes, rendering the formal right to vote meaningless.45 
- - - - - - - 
" Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides a basis for challenging all discriminatory 
election practices and procedures, focusing on the effects of the challenged practice instead 
of requiring the challenger to establish that the intent in imposing the requirement was to 
discriminate against a protected group. See 42 U.S.C. 5 1973(b). For an analysis of section 2 
enforcement, see Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority 
Representation, in CONTROVERSIES IN M I N O W  VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN 
P E R S P E C ~ E  66 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) [hereinafter 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING]. 
'O 42 U.S.C. 5 1973. Section 5 provisions protect minority voting rights in specific 
jurisdictions by requiring that the United States Department of Justice ("Justice 
Department") "preclear" the jurisdiction's districting plans prior to implementation. See 
Drew S. Days 111, Section 5 Enforcement and the Department of Justice, in CONTROVERSIES IN 
MINORITY VOTING, supra note 39, at 52. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act focuses on 
certain areas of the country, requiring pre-clearance by the Attorney General or United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia of any proposed districting plan for 
jurisdictions that previously erected barriers to black political participation. S. REP. NO. 97- 
417, at 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 182; see also United Jewish Orgs. v. 
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 156 (1977) (upholding race-based New York apportionment scheme 
challenged by Hasidic minority in jurisdiction). 
" The Voting Rights Act was designed to remedy racial discrimination in voting 
rights. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 182. To pursue this goal, "based on an extensive record filled 
with examples of the barriers to registration and effective voting encountered by language- 
minority citizens in the electoral process, Congress expanded the coverage of the Voting 
Rights Act to protect such citizens from effective disenfranchisement." Id. at 186. 
'2 "Men and women from racial and ethnic minorities now hold public office in places 
where that was once impossible." Id. at 181. 
See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,893-914 (Thomas, J., concurring); T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After 
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 629 (1993); Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court 
Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 210, 217. Some 
conservatives criticize this approach. Justice Thomas, together with Justice Scalia, objected 
to the shift in voting rights litigation toward effectiveness of minority representation. See 
42 U.S.C § 1973 (defining violations of VRA in terms of results). This generational 
metaphor for the evolution of voting-rights enforcement is used by many commentators. 
* Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES N 
MINORITY VOTING, supra note 39, at 7, 21 ("[Iln the five years after passage [of the VRA], 
almost as many blacks registered in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina as in the entire century before 1965."). 
'5 Vote dilution occurs where the value of an individual's vote may rise or fall based 
on how that vote is aggregated. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,555 (1964) ("[Tlhe right 
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Although the VRA has measurably improved minority representation,& 
some question the utility of increasing numerical representation without 
commensurate interest repre~entation.~~ 
b. Existing Political Representation Remedies Do Not and Cannot 
Apply to Women 
Unlike other successes of the Civil Rights Movement that have 
furthered gender equality,48 the voting rights paradigm cannot stretch to 
endorse a remed for electoral gender inequality. Women are not a B protected group,4 and have had functioning suffrage for over 85 years. 
of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just 
as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise."). Dilution may 
occur even if disenfranchisement no longer does. See Davidson, supra note 44, at 22 
(differentiating disenfranchisement from dilution). As the Supreme Court stated in 
Thornburg v. Gingles, "[dlilution of racial minority group voting strength [is] caused by 
[fragmenting] the dispersal of blacks into districts in which they constitute an ineffective 
minority of voters [,I or [by packing,] the concentration of blacks into districts where they 
constitute an excessive majority." 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986); see also Heather K .  Gerken, 
Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001) (analyzing 
individual rights-based doctrine and its connection to group-based claim of vote dilution). 
'6 See 2004 Election Brings New Black; to Congress, JET, Nov. 22,2004, at 10. See generally 
MILDRED L.AMER, CONG. RES. SERVICE REP. FOR CONG., BLACK MEMBERS OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONGRESS (1870-2004), http://www.congressionalblackcaucus.net (last visited Nov. 
28,2005) (providing data on African-Americans elected to Congress). The following chart 
illustrates changes in representation: 
These statistics combine census data and information from the 109th Congressional 
Membership Profile. AMER, supra note 3; RENBE E. SPRAGGINS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
WOMEN AND MEN IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 2002 POPULATION CHARACTEIUS~CS 
(2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-544.pdf; U.S. Census 
Bureau, PEOPLE: Race and Ethnicity, http://factfinder.census.gov/ jsp/saff/ SAFFInfo.jsp? 
-pageId=tp9 -race-ethnicity (last visited Feb. 6,2006). 
" Guinier, Tokenism, supra note 26, at 1103. 
" See Thomas, supra note 34. 
'' Under the definitive Supreme Court case on vote dilution under the Voting Rights 
Act, Thornburg v. Gingles, the central remedy for dilution is the creation of majority- 
minority single-member districts. 478 U.S. 30,84-85 (1986). To satisfy the three prongs of 
the Gingles test, a minority group must demonstrate that it is both geographically 
concentrated and sufficiently numerous to constitute a majority of a single-member district, 
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#Women by 
Race/Ethnicity 
14 - 
7 
1 
79 (including 
white women) 
Group 
Blacks 
Hispanics 
Asians 
Women 
Population 
(% of U.S.) 
12.9% 
13.3% 
4.4% 
51.1% 
# reps./ % of 
House 
42 / 9% 
26 / 5.9% 
6 / 1.4% 
68 / 15.5% 
# Senators = 
% of Senate 
1 
2 
2 
14 
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Proving second generation remedies of vote dilution depend on black 
voters' strong preference for black candidates." In contrast, women do 
not vote as a block, face no substantial geographical segregation, and do 
not necessarily prefer women candidates by substantial margins.5' Sexist 
men cannot gerrymander away women's representation, so second 
generation litigation, the remedy for minority vote dilution, cannot 
combat electoral gender inequality. 
In short, sex discrimination doctrine has never centered on gender and 
political representation. Similarly, voting rights established for racial 
and ethnic minorities cannot incorporate gender issues, either in form or 
in substance. Comparative equality scholarship points to ways in which 
that it is politically cohesive, and that its electoral success is being impeded by majority 
bloc voting. Id. at 48-51. It should be noted that the existence of the three Gingles factors is 
necessary, but not sufficient, proof of a section 2 violation under the Voting Rights Act. See 
Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2657 (1994); Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50. Women do 
not live in concentrated areas, so it would be impossible for them to meet the first prong of 
the Gingles test. The second prong of the Gingles test is that the minority group must be 
politically cohesive. Id. at 52-73. Such cohesiveness is demonstrated by a high "correlation 
between the race of the voter and the voter's choice of certain candidates." Id. at 53. It may 
be said that women fail this prong of the test because they are not necessarily politically 
cohesive - statistical studies, following the popular anti-essentialist feminist theory, hold 
that being a woman does not have fixed poliiical consequences. The third and find prong 
of the Gingles test requires that the minority group's preferred candidate be defeated by 
majority bloc voting. Id. at 51. "[Tlhe minority must be able to demonstrate that the white 
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it -- in the absence of special circumstances, 
such as the minority candidate's running unopposed -- usually to defeat the minority's 
preferred candidate." See generally BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION 
AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 61-81 (1992) (tracing vote dilution standard after 
Gingles). A minority group must therefore be sufficiently large and geographically 
compact to constitute a majority in a hypothetical single-member district. 
Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 26, at 1415-16. 
5' Unfortunately, although it would be interesting, no studies have been performed on 
the inclination of women to vote solely on gender association. If it were the case that 
women consistently voted more for women candidates, this prong may reflect the cause of 
under-representation. Recent studies show there is not an overall preference by women to 
vote for women candidates. Women Running for Office Face Many Obstacles, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 19, 2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2001-03-19- 
women.htm. The research was sponsored by the Barbara Lee Foundation and was 
gathered by pollsters Lake and DiVall, and political strategist Mary Hughes. The statistical 
information was gathered from interviews, campaign managers, exit polls, and polls from 
over 1,375 potential voters. The May 2000 poll has a 3% margin of error. However, certain 
groups of female voters, such as young women and educated women, substantially prefer 
women candidates. In contrast, married women who are homemakers tend to prefer male 
politicians. Vaishalee Mishra, Guide Places Keys to Statehouses in Women's Reach, 
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/578/context/cover/ (last visited 
Nov. 1,2005). Although it would be possible to demonstrate that women consistently lose 
for a particular seat, given that women do not collectively rally behind women candidates, 
the inability to elect a female candidate cannot qualify as a Gingles violation. 
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different legal cultures handle similar issues. With Parity, France 
responded directly to electoral gender inequality, inconceivable from the 
United States perspective where gender discrimination law and voting 
rights do not intersect. However, the most outlandish element of Parity 
is the larger question of quotas themselves. 
B. Quotas: The Universal Anathema 
Quotas, at least those labeled as such, constitute a pariah among 
policies. Across the ideological spectrum, conservative, liberal, and 
critical legal thinkers in the United States generally reject the idea of 
quotas, which "insulate all nonrninority candidates from competition 
from certain seats." Parity arouses such broad opposition in the United 
States because it is viewed as a quota. 
1. Liberal Rejection of Quotas 
For liberal theorists, quotas violate constitutional doctrine's 
ne~trality.'~ Normatively speaking, liberals assert that no group merits 
better treatment than any other group. "Classical liberal theory was 
preoccupied enough with issues of extending equality that it rarely 
discussed differen~e."~~ Liberals presume that one group's benefit 
disadvantages other A second, deeper liberal concern arises 
with the Rawlsian question of how to determine which groups deserve 
different treatment. The Rawlsian process places the decision-maker 
behind the "veil of ignorance" as to his or her social position, 
maximizing objectivity and removing self interest. Liberals assert that 
no objective answer that certain groups deserve beneficial treatment 
would result.55 
A third liberal concern is that ideas, rather than identity, should 
determine representation, reflecting "a general reluctance to mandate 
equality (or proportionality) of outcomes rather than alleged equality of 
opportunity."56 Insistence on the sanctity of the liberal democratic 
process leads to an insistence on equality of opportunity, not equality of 
52 Sunstein, supra note 22. 
53 Charles S. Maier & Sytte Klausen, lntroduction to HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN?, 
supra note 21, at 3,5. 
" This argument arose in the case of Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), in which white 
voters sued to overturn a majority-minority district. 
55 A wide range of liberal thinkers agree on this - Hannah Pitkii, Rian Voet, Amy 
Gutmann, and Dennis Thompson. See Mansbridge, supra note 21, at 26. 
56 Id. at 5. 
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outcome. Bruce Ackerman, for example, argues that neutrality should 
be strictly applied, in a way that resembles the French universalism 
discussed in Part 11.~' Inequitable treatment, he argues, cannot achieve 
equality.59 Ackerman criticizes those who prioritize identity politics over 
class issues.60 Ackerman's proposal for equitable distribution of national 
wealth explicitly rejects any affirmative action.61 Ackerman argues that 
focusing on inequality directs focus away from the ultimate goal of 
equality.62 
2. Critical Theory Rejection of Quotas 
Liberal and critical thinkers generally clash in many settings,63 but may 
agree in rejecting quotas. Critical (and critical race) theorists question 
57 Id. 
58 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & ANNE AWTOTT, T, STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 237-49 (1999). 
59 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 237-49 (1980). 
Equal opportunity in the workplace, Ackerman contends, cannot suffice to rectify 
the trend of increasing inequality: "Americans have always had an uncertain love affair 
with equal opportunity. We believe in it, we know it really doesn't exist in today's world, 
and yet we have learned to live comfortably in the gap between ideal and reality."ld. 
- - 
" To this end, Ackerman proposes eighty thousand dollars [to eachcitizen] will 
do much to aid the plight of women and minorities, but it will not serve as the "be all and 
end all in the struggle for real equality of opportunity." Id. at 62. Ackerman suggests that 
minority group members will be the so-called winners from stakeholding. Currently, one- 
third of all households have no net financial wealth. In the black community, this is 
increased to 61%. This disparity holds true for middle-class blacks, who earn about 70% of 
their white counterparts, but only own 15% of the white middle-class wealth. See id. at 60- 
61. Ackerman, however, rejects implementing affirmative action techniques in his 
stakeholding proposal: 
[wlhen each citizen comes forward to make her claim, it ought to be enough for 
her to say that she too is an American, involved in the common enterprise of 
redeeming the great words of the Declaration of Independence. This is a time for 
women and men, blacks and whites, to join in a mutual recognition of their 
standing as free and equal citizens without distracting references to the 
differences and injustices that still tear them apart. 
Id. 
62 See id. Moving away from the hypothetical, however, and returning to reality, an 
argument could be made in favor of actions and programs designed to put minorities on 
equal footing. As opposed to the hypothetical, in reality, citizens do not begin on equal 
ground. 
For example, the central assumption of critical race theorists is "that American 
society and its institutions, including its legal institutions, are fundamentally racist, and 
that racism is not a deviation from the normal operation of American society." Roy L. 
Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal Pleading, in 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 2, 3 (Dorothy A. Brown ed., 
2003). 
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quotas because they encourage tokenism and preserve essentialist 
understandings of identity. Whereas liberals view quotas as violating 
neutrality, critical theorists believe neutrality serves to maintain the 
inequality of the status quo. 
Quotas focus on numerical representation, which has led to 
"tokenism" in the context of majority-minority districting. Tokenism 
depends on descriptive representation, in which the identity of the 
representative matches that of the represented." As one critical race 
scholar asserts, quotas foster "equality of representation based simply on 
the election of descriptively black representatives."65 Although 
proportionally accurate, placing any thirteen black people in the Senate 
would not necessarily represent black communities. Supporters of 
affirmative action have argued for incrementalist programs while 
criticizing quota-defined affirmative action as malignant, inherently 
wrong and unj~stifiable.~~ 
Fearing the same essentialism decried by critical race theorists, many 
feminists hesitate to support quotas. For critical theorists, one cannot 
presume that women better represent women.67 With regard to gender, 
descriptive representation would presume that one's sex has a political 
meaning. 
3. Quotas, Descriptive Representation, and Essentialism 
Quotas for political representation require identity-based or 
"descriptive" representation. Descriptive representation involves "a 
descriptive likeness between representatives and those for whom they 
See Guinier, Tokenism, supra note 26, at 1103. 
65 Id. Although proportional representation may aid minority representation, as a 
neutral voting system, it does not necessarily aid minorities. 
" Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in AfFrrnative Action: Attacking 
Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043,1067. 
67 Guinier, Tokenism, supra note 26, at 1102-03. 
Authentic black representation, or "descriptive" representation, is the first 
important building block for black electoral success theory. Authenticity refers 
to community-based and culturally rooted leadership. The concept also 
distinguishes between rninority-sponsored and white-sponsored black 
candidates. Basically, authentic representation describes the psychological value 
of black representation. The term is suggestive of the essentialist impulse in 
black political participation: because black officials are black, they are 
representative. Thus, authenticity reflects the importance of race in defining the 
character of black political participation. 
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stand."68 In this sense, "[a] representative legislature, like a map or a 
mirror, is essentially an inanimate object, a representation of the people 
in the sense that a painting is a representation of what it depicts."69 Like 
a painting, descriptive representation presents a static portrait of a 
society." 
As quotas require descriptive representation, descriptive 
representation appears to presume an essentialist understanding of 
identity, and argument that will be revisited in Part 111. For identity to 
determine ideas, the category "women" must possess a concrete 
meaning. Even presuming women's under-representation based on low 
numbers of legislators ascribes to some essentialist notions of identity 
and representation. Women's representation quotas, likewise, presume 
that only a woman can represent women. Quotas rely on essentialism. 
Feminist debate has raged over essentialism and anti-essentialism, 
whether women inherently differ from men. Some feminists, many of 
them French, argue that the sexes are fundamentally different.71 This 
fixed idea of womanhood fosters cohesion at the cost of reducing the 
gender identity's fluidity. Anti-essentialist feminism holds that no 
essential notion of "womanhood" exists.72 Black feminists such as bell 
hooks and Kimberle Crenshaw have emphasized the "white nature" of 
such concepts, asserting that race and gender are intertwined." Gender 
theorists, led by United States thinkers such as Judith Butler, argue that 
notions of "womanhood" depend exclusively on cultural constructs. The 
use of "gender" rather than "sex" reflects a constructed, rather than 
biological, phenomenon.74 For example, anti-essentialists reject 
" Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, in REPRESENTATION 10 (Hanna F. 
Pitkin ed., 1969). 
Id. at 11. Thinking of political representation as art, a descriptive legislature must 
mirror the public, and "what qualifies a man to represent is his representativenes - not 
[for] what he does, but [because of] what he is, or is like." Id. at 10. 
'' Guinier, Tokenism, supra note 26, at 1102, n.114. 
" See infia Part II.A.l. 
72 ~udit-h Butler has argued that agency is created at the site of political struggle; it is 
not necessarily preexistent. Judith Butler, Contingent Foundations, in FEMINIST 
CONTENTIONS: A PHILOSPOHICAL EXCHANGE 35, 47-51 (Seyla Benhabib et al. eds., 1995); 
Mansbridge, supra note 21, at 6. 
See BELL HOOKS, AIN'T 1 A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 1-13,119-58 (1981); 
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and the Violence 
Against Women ofcolor, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). 
74 The construction of gender cannot be discussed without consideration of 
transgendered identity. Transgendered identity demonstrates the mutability of gender. 
Transgendered people expose the fallacy of the presumption that humanity is composed 
solely of men and women. The "gender binarism" calls into question the viability of a fdty- 
fifty scheme for representation unless there is some implicit recognition of how to include 
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presumptions that women are hard-wired nurturers, ascribing such 
behaviors to cultural constructs. 
Concerns about tokenism lead to calls for emphasizing interest 
representation. Representing ideas rather than identity allows fluidity," 
prioritizing political perspective over identity.76 Given the diversity 
among women, it may be difficult to determine "women's interests." 
Although social science reflects some preferences among women for 
some policies,n these preferences may not be easily predictable. "The 
advocacy of descriptive representation can emphasize the worst features 
of es~entialism."'~ 
To answer these questions, given Parity's ambitions, demands closer 
study of the French example. Does Parity serve to de-essentialize 
essentialism? How does France constitute the relationship between 
women and the universal? What can French legal culture about our own 
structures and systems? Does Parity point toward a reconfiguration of 
the essentialism/anti-essentialism, descriptive/interest dichotomies? 
Can some provisions for women's representation be constructed to 
reflect the United States' profound antipathy toward quotas? 
11. FRENCH PARITY: OBTAWING WOMEN'S EQUALITY 
THROUGH DIFFERENCE 
Parity's history and the debate surrounding its passage provide an 
instructive context for evaluating the relationship between gender and 
democracy in the context of liberal constitutionalism. "Parity" is defined 
transgendered people in this scheme. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY FATHER'S HOUSE: 
AFR~CA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE 45 (1992). The fluidity of racial identity and, as a 
consequence, of remedies for race-based discrimination, surfaces in Part In. See generally 
Darren Rosenblum, "Trapped" in Sing Sing: Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the Gender 
Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499 (2000). Although the essentialism debate primarily 
arises with regard to gender, many have raised such questions with regard to race. 
75 Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 26, at 1462 (discussing advantages of interest 
representation, in which community's ideas find representation). 
" It is worth noting that essentialist identities could also lead to interest 
representation: another critique of descriptive representation centers on the fact that "it is 
not clear what characteristics of the electorate need to be mirrored to insure a fair sample." 
Bernard Grofman, Should Representatives Be Typical of Their Constituents?, in 
REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 98 (Grofman, et al. eds., 1982). Thus, while 
anti-essentialism necessitates interest representation, interest representation does not 
require an anti-essentialist understanding of identity. 
Within the United States, studies by the Barbara Lee Foundation also reflect 
preferences of women voters as different from those of men. See Lindsay Crudele, Under 
the Wings of Women, Mar. 2, 2005, available at http://www.barbaraleefoundation.org/ 
aboutus/aboutus~show.htm?doc~id=263758. 
78 Mansbridge, supra note 21, at 30. 
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as "perfect equality."79 In the political sphere, it requires "the equality of 
representation of women and men."'' This Part will first address the 
history of women's suffrage and development and experience of Parity. 
Second, it will engage the role of France's universalism in representing 
women while ignoring other differences, including race, ethnicity and 
religion. Finally, this Part will explore how feminist theory transformed 
the understanding of France's universalism. 
This Part draws on several comparative methodo~o~ies.~~ Although 
this study reveals interesting parallels and contrasts with the United 
States' legal system, it enters the subject, France, though the broader 
context of French constructs of group inequality and difference." This 
highly contextual analysis attempts to avoid the "epistemological 
imperialism"83 that has drawn criticism from some scholars. The 
discussion emphasizes Parity's intellectual underpinnings, not only to 
reveal the nature of French discourse, but also to add nuance and de th 
to the United States' own construction of universalism and difference. H;: 
A. Parity: History, Passage, and Efectiveness 
Parity capped a long movement for women's suffrage and electoral 
equality. French women achieved suffrage after World War 11, but found 
that their numbers in government remained low. A second movement to 
institute some quotas obtained limited success after the Socialist Party 
victory of 1981, but the legislation was struck down by the Constitutional 
Court. Parity advocates reshaped their agenda to meet these 
constitutional concerns, refrarning the debate and ultimately succeeding 
in 2000. Parity's implementation has met with marked success in some 
elections and more modest advances in others, and continues itself to be 
the subject of much debate. 
1. French Consideration of Parity from the 1880s to the Early 1990s 
The idea of Parity dates back to 1884, when Hubertine Auclert, a 
leading French suffragist, wrote that women should have half the seats 
79 FRANCOISE GASPARD ET AL., AU POUVOLR, CITOYENNES! LIBERTE, EGALITE, PARITE 129 
(1992). 
" Id. 
" See Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 
40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221,232 (1999). 
82 See id. at 242. 
" Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH L.REv. 179,190 (2002). 
See Riles, supra note 81, at 246-47. 
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in the ~ s s e m b l ~ . ~  Auclert proposed that the Assembly should simply 
divide its seats between the sexes. She called for a political equality that 
would mean the "recognition of women as such as the other part of the 
sovereign people," where men and women could constitute the 
electorate equally together.86 
Despite ceaseless efforts to attain suffrage, French men represented 
women in their household for sixty years after Auclert's declaration, far 
longer than in most other demo~racies.'~ During the First World War, 
one politician proposed unsuccessfully that widows should vote, 
because the men through whom they were represented no longer could. 
It was only after Vichy's collapse in 1944 that French women obtained 
the vote, well after the Nineteenth Amendment's passage in the United 
states.= 
In France, as in the United States, a powerful feminist movement grew 
out of the political upheaval of the late 1960s, a movement which 
ultimately led to Parity's passage.89 At that time women wanted to be 
elected to government because of their differences with men, not in spite 
of them. It was their hope that they would be elected so that they could 
say and do things other than what the men had done in previous years.g0 
As a strategic move, in 1975 Fran~oise Giroud, Secretary for Women's 
Condition, introduced 100 measures for women, including a bill limiting 
the candidates on a list to 80% for either of the two sexes.9' A subsequent 
See Isabelle Giraud & Jane Jenson, Constitutionalizing Equal Access: High Hopes, 
Dashed Hopes?, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN?, supra note 21, at 69. 
86 SYLVIANE AGACINSKI, PARITY OF THE SEXES 154 (2001). 
GASPARD ET AL., supra note 79, at 102. 
88 Id. at 21. 
89 Yvonne Knibiehler, Democratic, desir des Femmes, in LA DEMOCRATIE 'A LA FRANCAISE' 
OU LES FEMMES INDESIRABLES 23 (Eliane Viennot ed., 1996). 
90 Id. 
9' The original language resewed 20% for women, but this language was removed at 
the advice of attorneys concerned about such a quota. Four years later, the Minister for 
Family and Women's Conditions proposed a 20% minimum for towns with populations 
above 2,500. GILL ALLWOOD & KHURSHEED WADIA, WOMEN AND POLITICS IN FRANCE 1958- 
2000, at 192 (2000); GASPARD ET AL., supra note 79, at 136-37. Although the Assembly 
approved the bill, the session ended before the Senate could debate it. The French 
legislative process involves a number of different steps. The first step is the Initiative in 
which Deputies and the Government are entitled to initiate legislation. The bills that are 
introduced by Deputies are called propositions de loi (Members' Bills) and the bills 
introduced by the government are called projets de loi. Once a bill has been initiated it gets 
sent for consideration in one of six standing committees, thus starting the second step. 
While the bill is in the committee, it will be studied and debated by a rapporteur, one of the 
members of the committee who is appointed to present his opinion on the bill. Then the 
committee will adopt the report and make a statement either recommending or rejecting 
the bill. During the third step, the inclusion of matters on the agenda, the bills are included 
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version passed, but was overturned by the Constitutional Council in a 
1982 ruling.92 However, voluntary commitments to women's 
representation arose among left-wing political parties throughout the 
1980s.~~ 
2. Parity, from Idea to Reality: 1992-2000 
In the early 1990s, Parity began to gain momentum.94 In March, 1992, a 
roundtable meeting was organized to serve as a "network for ~arity."'~ 
Months later, in A u  Pouvoir, Citoyennes! (To Power, Women Citizens!), 
Fran~oise Gaspard argued that the Revolution, the suffrage movement, 
and the postwar period all failed to address the issue of outcome-based 
women's participation in elected bodies.% This persuasive argument by 
an independent-minded former member of the National Assembly jump- 
started the movement. The Socialist Party accepted Parity as a voluntary 
goal." Still in the formative stage at this point, Parity continued to 
into the Assembly's agenda and the bills are considered in the order determined by the 
Government. Next the bills are given over for consideration on the floor of the Assembly. 
There are times when procedural motions can be made, however, where the result is that 
the bill may be rejected before it is debated. If not rejected, the bill will be considered 
clause by clause. After a few more motions, the fifth step requires that before a bill can be 
adopted by Parliament it must be passed in an identical form by both assemblies (the 
Senate and the Assembly). If changes are made then the bill will "shuttle" back and forth 
between the assemblies, known as the navette. Once the bill has been adopted, the Act of 
Parliament will be passed on to the Govenunent and the President of the Republic will 
make the Act public within 15 days. See Assemblee Nationale.fr, kgislative Role - 
Parliament's Law Making Powers (2005), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/ 
8ag.asp. For a detailed explanation of the French legislative process, in French, see 
Assemblee Nationale.fr, LA Prockdure Lkgislative, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/ 
connaissance/procedure.asp (last visited Jan. 25,2006). 
92 The Conseil Constitutionnel favors a notion of formal equality over equality of 
chances with the law. Decision 34, Feminine Quotas denied the proposed amendment to 
modify election rules requiring at least 25% of the candidates on the list be women. The 
Conseil believed that a "text that reserved a certain number of places for women. . . without 
doing the same for men . . . would be contrary to the principle of equality." A. F. 
Thompson, From Restoration to Republic, in FRANCE: GOVERNMENT AND S I E n  207, 211 
(J.M. Wallace Hadrill & J. McManners eds., 1970). 
" In the mid-1980s, political parties of the far left, including the Green party and the 
Communist Party, adopted voluntary commitments to Parity. The Green Party placed 
Parity of the sexes in its by-laws. Later in the 1980s, European institutions began 
considering the issue, with the Council of Europe adopting a Parity goal in 1989 as the most 
democratic way to represent both sexes. 
See Giraud & Jenson, supra note 85, at 73. 
95 CLAUDE DE GRANRUT, ALLEZ LES FEMME!: LA PAR~TE N POLITIQUE 34 (2002). 
% See GASPARD ET AL., supra note 79. 
97 Id. at 173. 
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undergo significant changes.g8 The following year, Le Monde, the French 
daily newspaper, published the "Manifesto of 577 for Paritary 
Democracy," placing Parity on the national stage, forcing political parties 
to respond.99 The left endorsed Parity, while some on the right 
attempted to ignore it.''' 
Confronting potential victory, Parity advocates began to take into 
account the concerns in the Constitutional Council's 1982 decision, 
shifting from guaranteeing legislative seats to requiring parties to 
guarantee half their candidacies. It was argued that quotas imposed on 
parties rather than on the legislature permitted a great deal more room 
for voters to express their choice for candidates.lO' 
3. Arguments for Parity 
During the mid-to-late 1 9 9 0 ~ ~  Parity advocates employed a variety of 
arguments, from the historical and the sociopolitical to the philosophical, 
to assert that women had a right to political representation which 
accurately reflected their numbers.lo2 
See id. Gaspard also proffered the novel power-sharing idea of doubling uninominal 
positions, thus requiring each party to propose a male and a female candidate for a given 
post. 
99 GRANRUT, supra note 95, at 34. 
The parties of the left, including the Socialist, Communist, Citizens' Movement, and 
Workers' Struggle parties, imposed upon themselves the Parity rule for the European 
Parliament elections in 1994, and the Green Party instituted it in its general rules. The 
parties of the right, however, attempted to ignore the issue. Well-regarded conservative 
women, such as Simone Veil, then Minister of Health and the City, argued in favor of a 
constitutional amendment for Parity. Id. Legislators proposed a version of progressive but 
non-mandatory Parity. Leading male politicians came out in favor of Parity, including two 
candidates in the 1995 Presidential race. One conservative candidate, Edouard Balladur, 
proposed a 30% quota for women in party list-elections. The other conservative candidate, 
then-mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, supported the creation of a national commission for 
Parity, with financial incentives for implementation by political parties. Lionel Jospin, the 
Socialist candidate, also supported financial incentives for implementation of Parity even 
though the Socialists had accepted Parity as a voluntary goal. Id. These campaign 
promises led to little action, despite token efforts by then Prime Minister Alain Jupp6. Id. 
lo' ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 91, at 211. 
Irn During this period, Parity advanced by virtue of other political events. President 
Chirac dissolved Parliament in April 1997 to force elections, hoping to increase his 
majority. Instead, the Socialists capitalized on discontent in part by sticking to its 
commitment to have women as at least 30% of its candidates. GRANRUT, supra note 95, at 
35-36. Parity received support from polling numbers culled by advocates that 
demonstrated that large maiority of the French believed that women and men should have 
- , , 
equal representation. See generally Guillame Frechette et al., Endogenous Affirmative 
Action: Gender Bias Leads to Gender Quotas (June 17, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), 
. .  . 
available at http://homepages.nyu.edu/-gf35/~rint/fmm.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2066); 
Interview with Francoise Gaspard, in N.Y., N.Y. (Jan. 24, 2005). The new Prime Minister, 
Heinonline - -  39 U . C .  Davis L. Rev. 1141 2005-2006 
1142 University of California, Davis [Vol. 39:1119 
a. Critique of France's "Monosexual ~ e m o c r a c ~ " ' ~ ~  
The "maleness" of the political class, Parity advocates argued, 
constituted a "monosexual" democracy, in which men acquire political 
power early in their lives, often based on social position and family. "In 
certain families, being a deputy is passed down from father to son."'" At 
the highest political spheres, the non-participation of women is "the rule 
rather than the exception,"'05 including at the level of language itself, in 
which the term for politician, "homme politique," references men.'06 
With women's levels of electoral representation hovering at below 
10% in many jurisdictions, Parity advocates claimed that women were 
being subjected to the rule of men.lw "The monopolization of power by a 
group, by a clique, as well as by a sex is an usurpation."'08 Parity 
advocates made a simple assertion: a democracy without women is not a 
d e m o ~ r a c ~ . ' ~  "France believes itself to be a democracy, but it is not one. 
Even if women vote, it is the men who make the Men's political 
supermajority lent moral force to the Parity movement, obliging 
opponents to assent to Parity in word, if not by deed."' Parity advocates 
Lionel Jospin, declared in June 1998 that he would propose a constitutional amendment 
regarding Parity yielding several competing proposals. One suggested an expansive set of 
actions, including the creation of a delegation of women's rights and equal opportunities in 
each chamber of the legislature, term limits, university training for political participation, 
and the suppression of any obstacle to women's and young women's participation in 
politics. Jospin rejected the breadth of these actions, leaving the requirement that 50% of a 
party's candidates be women as the principal feature of the law. 
'" MARIEIT SINEAU, PROFESSION FEMME POLITIQUE: SEXE ET POUVOLR SOUS LA 
CINQUIEME REPUBUQUE 240 (2001). 
'M GRANRUT, supra note 95, at 45. This family trend is not unique to France. Currently 
in the U.S. Congress, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass) and his son Representative 
Patrick Kennedy (D-RI), sisters Representative Linda Sanchez (D-CA) and Representative 
Loretta Sanchez (D-CA), and brothers Senator Ken Salazar (D-CO) and Representative John . 
Salazar (D-CO) all serve in Congress. AMER, supra note 3, at n.13. 
I" GASPARD ET AL., supra note 79, at 122. 
Indeed, the most commonly used word for "politician" in French is "homrne 
politique," or "political man," not "politicien," which would be the equivalent of politician 
in English, revealing a widespread presumption that a politician will be a man. 
lrn Such assertions ignored the fact that many of the voters who had elected these men 
were themselves women. Women's advocates thus conflated representation with 
descriptive representation, presuming, at least to some extent, that only women can 
represent women. See supra Part LB.3, regarding the concept of descriptive representation 
and its role in the Parity debate. 
'" GASPARDET AL., supra note 79, at 181. 
'" SINEAU, supra note 103, at 242. 
'Io GASPARD ET AL., supra note 79, at 19. 
"' For example, President Chirac's support for Parity seemed to many to be superficial 
at best. This could be because although Chirac stated that he supported Parity, his center- 
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responded by demanding inclusion: "On the social level as on the legal 
level, it is for women to demand to occupy not second place in the scope 
of humanity, but the first, in equality with men.""' This male 
supermajority represented part of a deeper problem with French 
democracy. 
b. Parity as a Solution to a Crisis of Democracy 
Many French commentators decried what they called a crisis of 
democracy,"3 ascribing social problems to failures of the democratic 
system.114 Economic crises led to a "crisis of political 
in which the elected lost their legitimacy due to their failure to imagine 
an "other" alternative future.l16 A more participatory democracy, with 
"new blood""' many asserted, would ameliorate these problems. 
Advocates assured that "[olur bet is that only a larger demand for justice 
can regenerate demo~rac~.""~ 
Parity, advocates argued, would not only correct electoral gender 
inequality, but would remedy broader sociopolitical ills. Advocates 
proffered the essentialist argument that women better understand the 
problems of poverty, youth, and unemployment,119 and would pursue 
different policies with regard to environment, military, and welfare 
spending.'20 Women's family experience, it was argued, was "a sort of 
training ground for leading action oriented toward others and, 
ultimately, the Women would open up government, raising 
right coalition ran less than 20% female candidates during the elections of 2002. See 
Garance Franke-Ruta, Liberte, Egalite, Sororite, LEGAL AFF. 30 (2003). 
]I2 GASPARD ET AL., Supra note 79, at 124. 
]I3 ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 91, at 213. "The main indicators of this crisis 
included the growing gap between the concerns of the French people and the political elite, 
repeatedly demonstrated by public opinion polls; rising abstention rates; the failure of the 
parties to recruit new members; and public disaffection with a political class in which 
scandals seemed endemic." Id. 
11' See generally GASPARD ET AL., supra note 79. 
I l5  SINEAU, supra note 103, at 245-46. 
It6 Id. at 246. 
GRANRUT, supra note 95, at 58-59, 
lt8 GASPARD ET AL., supra note 79, at 181. 
Id. at 182. 
SINEAU, supra note 103, at 488; see also ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 91, at 204. 
l 2  GRANRUT, supra note 95, at 59-60. Granrut also argues: 
[wloman is built starting from experiences, traditions, of respect for life but also 
for self worth and for the faculty of erasing oneself before the birth of another. 
Maternity obligates her to develop a method of thinking and a rhythm of action 
turned toward the future, medium or long-term. She belongs to an intellectual 
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issues that otherwise would have gone ignored, bridging the gap 
between the people and the political class.'" 
"The debate on Parity only served to restart the question of the 
renewal of democracy by ~ o m e n . " ' ~  Advocates succeeded in tylng this 
dichotomy between the represented and the representatives to the 
existence of democracy itself, arguing: "[wle say very simply that as 
long as the Parity of the sexes is not adopted, there will be no 
democracy."'24 Parity advocates also pointed to polls indicating 70% 
support among the electorate, with no difference between women and 
men. These arguments ultimately succeeded, leading to passage of 
Parity.lZ5 
4. Passage of Parity 
The final version of the law amended the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic of 1958, and provided for legislation that would implement the 
constitutional changes."' Following Parity's passage, law Number 2000- 
493 of June 6, 2000, favoring the equal access of women and men to 
electoral office and elected functions, was executed to implement the 
constitutional tran~formation.'~~ 
discipline that is neither bureaucratic nor technical but which demands 
programmed objectives, a lot of love, will, and realism. 
Id. at 60. 
In ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 91, at 214. Some advocates even asserted that Parity 
in the legislature would serve as a model for other organizations, including those in the 
private sector. See, e.8.. GASPARD ET AL., supra note 79, at 28. Others held that French 
politics in general would benefit with more women elected to public office. See Giraud & 
Jenson, supra note 85, at 80; see also ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 91, at 205. Still others 
recognized that a change in the legislature would not make a real difference in the "sites of 
power in contemporary France." Id. at 205. 
Smu\u, supra note 103, at 246. 
'" Id. at 14. 
Scott, supra note 23, at 32,44. 
Iz6 Law No. 99-569 of July 8, 1999, Joumal Officiel de la Rkpublique Fran~aise U.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], July 9, 1999, p. 10175, available at http://www.legifrance. 
gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheExperteJorf.jsp (retrieve text by law number). The language 
of law Number 99-569, follows: 
Article 1 - Article 3 of the Constitution of October 4, 1958 is completed by a 
paragraph as follows: "The law favors the equal access of women and men to elected office 
and elected functions." 
Article 2 - Article 4 of the Constitution of October 4, 1958 is completed by a 
paragraph as follows: "They will contribute to the execution of the principal enunciated in 
the last paragraph of Article 3 of the Constitution under conditions determined by the 
law." GRANRUT, supra note 95, at 39-40. 
12' Law No. 2000-493 of June 6, 2000, Joumal Officiel de la Republique Fran~aise U.O.] 
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This transformation required enforcement mechanisms depending on 
the election in question. In France's semi-proportional system, 
municipal, regional, European and some senatorial elections use party 
slates, while others, notably National Assembly elections, require voters 
to select a particular candidate. In a list proportional election, instituting 
Parity appeared relatively simple - every other name had to correspond 
to the "other" sex. Should a party fail to present candidates of 
alternating gender, the prefecture would refuse to present the list on the 
ballot. Parties were required to name women to half their candidacies or 
lose entirely the ability to field any candidates at 
-- - - 
[Official Gazette of France], June 7, 2000, p. 8560, available at http://www.legifrance. 
gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheExperteJorf.jsp (retrieve text by law number). Title I of law 
Number 2000493 states: 
Dispositions related to elections following a list method, that is to say the 
principal elections: On each of the lists, the differential between the number of 
candidates of each sex cannot be higher than one. At the head of each group of 
six candidates in the order of presentation of the list should figure an equal 
number of candidates of each sex. For senatorial elections and for the European 
Parliament, on each of the lists, the differential between the number of 
candidates of each sex cannot be higher than one. Each list is composed 
alternately of a candidate of each sex. 
Title I1 states: "Dispositions related to the declarations of candidacy: Henceforth, 
candidates are required to make a declaration including their signature, stating their name, 
sex, date and location of birth, residence, and profession." 
Title III states: 
Dispositions related to the aide given to political parties and groups. If, for a 
political party or group, the difference between the number of each sex, having 
declared party affiliation, since the last election of the National Assembly, 
conforming to the second paragraph of Article 9, goes beyond 2% of the total 
number of candidates, the total of the first fraction which is attributed in 
application of articles 8 and 9 is diminished by a percentage equal to the half of 
this difference related to the total number of candidates. . . . This reduction is not 
applicable to political parties and groups having presented exclusively overseas 
candidates if the difference in the number of candidates of each sex related to the 
party is not superior to one. . . . A report of evaluation of the instant law will be 
presented by the Government to the Parliament in 2002, and each three years 
afterward. It includes as well a detailed study of the evolution of the 
feminization of regional elections, of senatorial and municipal elections not 
affected by the law, deliberative bodies of intercommunal structures, and local 
executive. 
Title IV states that the law will enter into force as of the next elections of the relevant 
legislative bodies. GRANRUT, supra note 95, at 3941. 
JANINE MOSSUZ-LAVAU, ASSOCIATION DES FEMMES DE L'EUROPE MERIDIONALE, 
RAPPORT NATIONAL FRANCAIS 43 (2000) (noting elections by list where three or fewer 
candidates appear to also avoid Parity rules). 
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French voters elect executive posts or National Assembly seats in 
single-candidate elections, as in the United States. For these elections, a 
party's candidates overall must be half women and half men. A party 
whose candidates number less than 50% women will face a reduction in 
the state's financial support by the percentage equal to half of the 
difference between male and female  candidate^.'^^ For example, if a 
party has 55% men and 45% women candidates, its financial support will 
be reduced by 5%.13' 
5. Parity Results: Advancement, but Not Equality 
The elections conducted since the passage of Parity reveal both sharp 
improvements in women's representation in some elections and less 
marked increases in other areas, revealing both the efficacy and 
limitations of the recent law. Unsurprisingly, the same requirement of 
50% yields different results depending on the enforcement method. 
Political parties avoided losing all possibility of victory in list elections, 
in which voters elect a list, usually determined by a political party, but 
made a markedly smaller effort in elections where the risk was only 
financial. 
a. List Elections: Revolutionary Electoral Change for Women 
List elections, with their draconian enforcement mechanisms, saw the 
greatest successes for Parity. The French Senate, composed of 320 
members elected to nine-year staggered terms, utilizes an irregular 
combination of list-ballots and direct elections.13' In 2001, Senators 
seeking re-election were able to effectively skirt Parity requirements by 
Law No. 2000-294 of Apr. 5, 2000, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise U.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Apr. 6, 2000, p. 5238, art. 141, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheExperteJorf.jsp (retrieve text by law 
number). "Le mandat de depute est incompatible avec l'exercice de plus d'un des mandats 
enumeres ci-apres: conseiller regional, conseiller ?I l'assembl6e de Corse, conseiller general, 
conseiller de Paris, conseiller municipal d'une commune d'au moins 3500 habitants." Id. 
There is no Parity provision for elections in localities under 3500 inhabitants. 
'" CATHERINE SOPHIE DIMITROULIAS & MCHELINE GALABERT, ASSOCIATTON DES FEMMES 
DE L'EUROPE MERIDIONALE, LA REPRESENTATTON EUROPEENNE AU FEMININ: PORTRAIT 
D'ELUES D'ESPAGNE, DE FRANCE, DE GRECE, D'ITALIE ET DU PORTUGAL 4-5 (2000) [hereinafter 
LA REPRESENTATION] (stating that 18 of 33 members of cabinet are women). 
'I See Effets directs et indirects de la loi du 6 juin 2000: un Bilan Contrastt?, 
http:/ /www.obse~atoire-parite.gouv.~/travaux/rapport~08/rapport~2005.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 1,2006). Approximately one-third of Senators are eligible for re-election every 
three years. Of the 102 seats u p  for election in 2001, 74 were list seats. The senatorial term 
was reduced to six years in 2003. Id. 
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claiming different party affiliations.13' Thus, they ensured opposing 
candidates fewer chances for success and ensured their own victory. As 
enforcement has met with structural obstacles, this practice has become 
more widespread.133 Despite male incumbents skirting Parity by running 
in newly-created political parties, the number of women elected tripled 
from 6.9% to 21.5%.lH While nearly a third of new Senators were 
women, the percentage of women's representatives increased only 
marginally due to staggered senatorial elections.lJ5 
The most dramatic success for Parity has been in municipal elections 
where women have obtained near-Parity in many positions.'36 
Interestingly, municipalities governed by conservative parties showed 
the most marked improvements. Parity has also led to a cultural change, 
whereby the inclusion of women in executive positions is expected.137 
Parity's continued effect will be seen in future municipal e1ecti0ns.l~~ 
More importantly, these local elections create larger numbers of 
experienced politicians to run for higher offices. 
Is2 Frechette et al., supra note 102, at 6. 
Among these obstacles are: (1) ballot reform adopted in July 2003 whereby the 
threshold was raised beyond that which proportional representation applies (a system 
which is effective only in the 30 Departments who elect at least four senators - "Less 
proportional representation, therefore less Parity," "Malgr4 les reticences des elus, la parit6 
gagne du terrain au Palais du Luxembourg, Le Monde") and (2) the practice of separate 
listing as discussed above. 
I" In numbers, there were 22 women, up from 7. 
I" In 2001, the number of women Senators increased from 20 to 35, representing an 
increase from 6.25% to 10.9%. See MOSSUZ-LAVAU, supra note 128. In the 2004 Senatorial 
elections, women Senators increased by 7.7Y0, again gaining nearly a third of all newly 
elected seats. See also L'observatoire, La parit6 en Europe, http://www.observatoire- 
parite.gouv.fr/portail/list~parite.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). The proportion of newly 
elected members went up from less than 8% to 24.2%. 
In March 2001, women's presence among the elected went from 21.7% to 47.5%. 
They have even won positions as mayor of their localities. 
13' For example, Paris's mayor, Bertrand Delanoe, who is France's first openly-gay 
mayor, placed women in a majority of his cabinet posts. LA REPRESENTATION, supra note 
130, at 2-3. 
The effectiveness of the Parity Law became clear during the cantonal, or regional, 
elections held on the same dates of 2001. In those elections, which are not yet covered by 
the Parity Law, women's share rose from 8.4% to 9.8%, despite the fact that women 
candidates increased by over a third. This was augmented in the 2004 elections to a 
disappointing 10.91%. Out of 100 Departments, 19 did not elect a single woman. AIFP, 
Demain la Parit6, http://www.int-evry.fr/demain-la-parite (last visited Feb. 6,2006). 
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b. Parity's Single Candidate Election Failure 
In May 2002, with over 16 candidates up for the first round of the 
Presidential election, the French electorate's vote was fractured with the 
shocking result that, after incumbent Chirac, the second-highest number 
of votes went to extreme-right wing National Front leader Jean-Marie Le 
Pen. This inspired the largest anti-fascist protests in decades, leading to 
Chirac's 82% victory, a result that presaged an equally significant 
conservative win in the June 2002 legislative elections, the first single- 
name ballot election after Parity's passage. Women represented 38.5% of 
the candidates for the National Assembly in first round elections and 
only 23.9% in the second round. These figures suggest that parties 
placed relative inexperienced newcomers (women) in positions 
competing against undefeatable (male) opponents who were much more 
likely to win.'39 In the end, only 71 women were elected, leaving many 
observers extremely disappointed after the unquestionable success of the 
prior year's municipal elections.'* 
c. Parity Across the Political Parties 
Parity has varied across the political spectrum, with parties on the left 
respecting the law more (with 40% of candidates) than parties on the 
right (with 25%). Large parties preferred to keep male candidates and 
lose funding. For example, the Union pour la Majorit6 Presidentielle 
(UMP) lost over five million dollars in state funding because less than a 
quarter of its candidates were women.l4l Smaller parties, relying more 
on state funding, more closely match the goals of Parity.14* The success 
I" LA REPRESENTATION, supra note 130, at 3-4. 
The total 71 women deputies in the National Assembly in 2002 amounted to only a 
small increase over prior elections: there were 35 women deputies in 1995 and 59 in 1997. 
No less a source than Elle magazine succinctly voiced its disappointment with the outcome 
of the 2002 elections: its lead editorial was titled, Parity, not charity. The editorial criticized 
the political parties for their failure to include as many women as Parity required, arguing 
that whenever there is danger, teams close ranks, and men, reacting to the threat posed by 
the National Front, saw Parity as "a luxury." Michele Fitoussi, La Paritt Pas La Charitt, ELLE 
IMAG., June 3,2002, at 7. 
I" Jacqueline Remy, Paritt bien ordonnh, L'EXPRESS (Fr.), Jun. 20, 2002, at 36-37. The 
UMP lost €4,264,738, or $5,117, 686 in state funding. See IMARIE-JO ZIMMERMAN, EFFETS 
DIRECIS ET INDLRECTS DE LA LO1 DU 6 JUIN 2000: UN BUN CONTRAST& (2005), available at 
http:/ /www.observatoire-parite.gouv.fr/travaux/rapport~O8/rapport~2005.pdf. 
For example, the Green Party, Communist Party, and National Front all presented 
more than 45% women candidates. Curiously among these was the National Front, which 
won no seats in the final legislature. See Frontnational.com, Legislatives - Les Rbultats, 
http://www.frontnational.com/lefn_resultaleglatives.php (last visited Nov. 28, 2005). 
Le Pen blamed Parity for the loss of any representation, arguing that in naming 
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of small party leaders in finding and fielding women candidates reveals 
the inaccuracy of assertions by large parties that it is difficult to find 
women  candidate^.'^^ 
6.  Results Below Parity: Two Interpretations 
Several explanations point to the basis for Parity's failure to lead to 
substantially higher women's representation in the National Assembly. 
Activists and Parity supporters blame an ineffective law and the male 
establishment's fervent defense of incumbency. Empirical explanations, 
however, point to a broader preference among the French for male 
candidates that colored the enactment as well as the enforcement of the 
law. 
a. Male Legislators Resisting Parity 
Parity advocates blame several factors for Parity's limited success. 
First, although the law passed, it did not include other provisions to 
improve women's access to representation. Prior versions of the law 
included provisions to promote women's representation in ways that 
would involve training and education, not just electoral requirements. 
Second, male party leaders and incumbents manipulate the system in 
several ways. They select fewer women than is required by law, 
incurring fines instead of fielding women candidates. In list elections, 
incumbents create new political parties to be able to run on different 
lists, protecting their incumbency. Male party leaders select women 
from civil society, which may make the women more dependent on 
party leaders once in the legislature, and may make them less effective 
legislators. The Parity Observatory, established by the law to manage 
enforcement, faces severe underfunding and understaffing. Taken 
together, these actions demonstrate both active and passive resistance to 
the goals of 
b. Empirical Explanations: Voters' Preference for Male Candidates 
Empirical studies suggest another basis for the failure of Parity's goals 
- male deputies who seek to preserve their incumbency and an 
inexperienced women as candidates, the National Front suffered at the polls. 
'" MOSSUZ-LAVAU, supra note 128, at 3-4; Fitoussi, supra note 140. The party of 
President Chirac, which had supported Parity, only had women for one-fifth of its 
candidates. Although the positions are nominated, rather than elected, one-quarter of the 
Prime Minister's cabinet were women. 
IU GASPARD ET AL., supra note 79. 
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electorate that consistently prefers men to women candidates.14' A study 
of Parity's adoption by Frechette, Morelli & Maniquet suggests different 
reasons both for the passage of Parity and for its inability to force an 
increase in women's representation in the National ~ s s e m b l ~ . ' ~ ~  First, 
this empirical model provides an alternate explanation as to why a male 
legislature approved Parity. In this study, incumbents favor a Parity law 
based on two assumptions: 1) that they, the men already representing 
their districts, will fill the male slot; and 2) voters prefer male candidates. 
For incumbent male politicians, this study asserts, male politicians will 
prefer to compete in a Parity context rather than one with no ~ari ty ."~ 
The second reason centers on the requirement that political parties that 
fail to meet Parity requirements must pay a fee. This element of the law 
favors larger political parties as they can afford to pay the fees and gain 
an advantage over smaller parties by doing so.14' 
The Frechette study shows that the success of men after the passage of 
Parity demonstrates the preference for male candidates. "For a male, 
having an opponent of opposite gender increases the probability of 
winning - and for a woman it decreases it."149 Both critics and 
supporters of Parity point to women's political newness as a factor. The 
empirical data show that while women candidates are less experienced, 
this factor only proved relevant: "the male advantage exists among 
young new candidates and incumbent candidates, and in both cases 
there should be a relatively homogenous experience across genders."'50 
Overall, the data shows that voters (not parties) favor male candidates - 
'" Frechette et al., supra note 102, at 5. 
" See id. 
"' Id. at 9. 
'" Id. at 12-13. 
[Plarties are coalitions of strategic incumbents, so they strategically choose their 
preferred institutional system at time 0, and they play strategically at the list 
composition stage. A district where a party is almost sure to win is also one 
where it has an incumbent, and hence, for the values of the parameter we look at, 
it is rational for the party to have the incumbent running there. However, there 
is no room in the model for male conspiracy, which would bias the party list 
composition decisions in favor of men just because of their gender. Only self 
interest matters. 
Id. at 13. 
"' Id.at18. 
Id. at 20. The authors of the study go on to state that this issue of experience is 
tangential to their point: "[Olur story is in no way tied to this observation. Even if the male 
bias was the product of perceived experience differences, our model would still apply, 
since it relies on the existence of a male advantage, not on a specific source of it." Id. 
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a male candidate has a 22% higher chance of winning than a female 
candidate.15' As a consequence, particularly in a tight race, political 
parties pay close attention to a candidate's gender. Where a race either 
appears to be an easy win or loss, gender does not figure significantly. 
Where the race is a very close one, the 22% male advantage carries 
significant weight.152 
In the senatorial elections, where each party list had to have complete 
balance of genders, Parity led to the proliferation of parties. In one case 
where there were two incumbents from the same party, the incumbents 
split into two parties so that they could both present themselves in 
different districts. Thus, they permitted their new parties to maintain 
gender balance but also permitted the voters to express their pro-male 
bias and re-elect both  incumbent^.'^^ 
c. Looking Forward: Increased, but Not Equal, Representation 
Competing explanations arise as to Parity's failures. The national 
elections of 2002 disappointed expectations after the prior year's sharp 
increase in representation. Parity, nonetheless, markedly increased 
representation for women, especially in list elections. Overall, far more 
women serve as representatives now than before Parity. As women 
become more involved in the political process, more candidates will be 
available and competitive for national office. This political change may 
require time to fulfill Parity's goal of equal representation. 
Although statistical explanations have persuasive bases to explain the 
passage of Parity and its failure to achieve its goals, Parity succeeded in 
substantially increasing representation in the regional elections. Parity 
increased the potential for women's political participation and 
established a basis for women's advancement in government and civil 
society. However, Parity has wrought a more fundamental change in 
political psychology, perhaps leading to wider acceptance for women in 
politics. Responding to these insufficient excuses for failing to meet 
Parity's requirements, Elle  magazine warned cynical politicians to take 
note: "paying instead of applying the law wiU not always pay off."154 
That Elle, a fashion magazine, evinced such concern for Parity's 
enforcement demonstrates that Parity has reached far deeper into the 
'I Id. at 20. 
lS2 Id. at 22. That said, parties did not treat men and women differently in terms of the 
average funding provided to the candidates. Id. at 23. 
Id. at 25. 
I" Fitoussi, supra note 140. 
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consciousness of the French, transforming the nation into one that 
expects women to have equal opportunities to win elections. Parity's 
existence suggests a surprising level of comfort with the notion that 
women deserve equal opportunities to stand for election. 
Arguments that women will improve French democracy may appear 
risky, because the potential failure of women to deliver change may 
weaken support for women's representation. Polls reflected that such 
arguments drew on popular perceptions, showing that the French 
wanted a "feminization" of politics because they believed women would 
bring new and unique skills to the political arena.155 This transformation 
reveals key elements of French legal culture, from theories of democracy 
to gender, from universalism to difference. Compared to the United 
States, French legal culture maintains a more nuanced vision and 
practice of the intersection of gender and democracy. In contrast to the 
inclusion of gender within France's universalism, this same universalism 
prevents even minor consideration of racial, ethnic, or religious identity 
in any state function. 
B. French Constitutional Universalism: Representing Women, 
Ignoring Minorities 
Underlying France's approach to democracy is a concept of pure 
universalism, a radical Eighteenth Century Enlightenment response to 
monarchy: each citizen is completely equal before the law. Any 
differentiation by the state between one citizen and another based on 
group identity would violate this primary rule of French 
constitutionalism. l e  rigor with which France holds to this 
universalism initially froze guarantees for women's representation in 
1982.'~~ Advocates re-framed their proposal, some by using the feminist 
discourse of difference to reflect a gendered universalism, constructing 
Parity as the voice of a universal composed of two sexes. In contrast, the 
French state refuses to take account of other groups, refusing to compile 
statistics on racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, under the auspices of 
~niversa1ism.l~~ 
-- - 
ls5 SINEAU, supra note 103, at 246. 
'" Thompson, supra note 92. The Conseil based its decision on Article 3 of the 1958 
Constitution and Article 6 of the 1789 Declaration. Id. 
Is' See Martin Arnold, Libert6, egalit6 et fraternit6, but Only for Some, FIN .  TIMES 
(London), Nov. 7,2005, at 2. 
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1. Universalism Defines the French Republic 
French democracy relies on a notion of universal rights, born in the 
French Revolution out of the Enlightenment philosophy. The "Universal 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen," first heard as a speech 
given early in the ~evolution,'58 would become the basis for future 
democratic efforts. Not only would this Declaration become the 
preamble of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the governing system 
of France since 1958,lS9 but it would also serve as the basis for the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the United Nations charter.16' 
Under universalist doctrine, all should be treated equally, without 
regard to membership in any particular group. All citizens benefit'from 
this equal level of treatment. In the Revolution, "[tlhe priority was the 
abolition of the feudal rights, to the suppression of the orders, bodies, 
and corporations. . . . And this permitted the belief that France put into 
place the concept of uni~ersality."'~~ A key element of the Declaration's 
radical egalitarianism is the institution of a meritocracy for public 
service.162 This concept of universalism relates to French notions of the 
republic: the elimination of cultural difference is "the best defense 
against intercommunity tensions, violence, political and cultural 
fragmentation and the destruction of democracy."'63 
One crucial element of this universalism is the principle of lai'citt. 
Under lai'citt, France's nonreligious authorities exercise political and 
administrative power.'" This separation has consistently dominated 
SieyPs, Reconnaissance et exposition raisonnie des Droits de I'Homme et du Citoyen, (July 
20-21), 1789, referenced in GASPARD ETAL., supra note 79, at 51. 
I" DAVID THOMSON, DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE SINCE 1870, at 285-86 (1964). 
IM Human Rights Comm'n, Celebrating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
http://www.hrc.co.nz/index.php?p=451&format=text#2 (last visited Jan. 27, 2006) ("In 
1789 the French Revolution produced the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. 
Article I1 declares that 'The aim of all political association is the conservation of the natural 
and inalienable rights of man. These rights are: liberty, property, security and resistance to 
oppression . . . .' It was the humanitarian premise in this Declaration that was to inspire 
and inform the development of the ideology surrounding the UDHR and modem ideas of 
human rights.") 
16' GASPARD, supra note 79, at 20-40. 
'62 Thompson, supra note 92, at 210. In 1789, Article 6 of the Declaration set forth the 
concept of equality and the foundation of a pure meritocracy in France. Eligibility for civil 
service employment became based on a person's virtues and talents. The Conseil d'Etat 
formally invoked this principle in the 1954 Barel decision. Id. at 211. 
16) ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 91, at 215-22. "Parity, it is claimed, would 
distinguish between categories of citizens, and this is contrary to the principle of 
universalism, according to which all citizens are equal and, in political terms, the same. 
Parity would thus destroy one of the very bases of democracy." Id. 
'" Lai'citk has no direct translation. The closest word-is secularity. Michel Troper, 
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French church-state relations since the overthrow of the Ancien Regime. 
At that time, the Revolution adopted a strict anti-clerical stance,'& even 
going so far as to expropriate and sell church property.'" It is this same 
principle that serves to require that the law be agnostic as to racial or 
ethnic identity, although there is some debate regarding whether this 
agnosticism derives from the more fundamental question of 
uni~ersalisrn.'~~ Indeed, as one political theorist said, "democracy knows 
neither black, nor white, neither big, nor small, neither intelligent, nor 
stupid, neither rich, nor poor, neither men, nor women."'68 
2. Lai'cite' and the Deliberate Invisibility of Race 
France's universalism arises most prominently with regard to racial, 
ethnic, and religious identity through the principle of lai'cite', which 
translates loosely at best, as secularism. France has the most diverse 
immigration population in Europe, especially since France is "ready to 
grant political asylum to all opponents of oppression, injustice, and 
t~talitarianism."'~~ France's religious diversity comes from the long- 
standing Protestant and Jewish minorities, but France first became a de 
facto multicultural society during the 1950s and 1960s with the mass 
labor migration from the North African countries of Algeria, Morocco 
French Secularism, or La'icit6,21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1267,1267 (2000). Although there is no one 
official definition for the term, President Jacques Chirac discussed the concept during a 
speech made in December 2003. During his speech he stated that "[llai'cite' guarantees 
freedom of conscience. It protects the freedom not to believe or not believe. It assures 
everyone of the possibility to express and practice their faith peaceably, freely, though 
without threatening others with one's own convictions or beliefs." See T. Jeremy Gunn, 
Religious Freedom and Ldicitk: A Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 B W  L. REV. 
419,428 (2004); see also President Jacques Chirac, Discours Chirac Loi Lai'citk (Dec. 17, 2003), 
http:/ /www.fil-inf0-france.com/actualites-monde/discours-chirac-loi-laicite.htm 
[hereinafter Discours Chirac Loi Lai'citel (French text of speech). This concept reinforces the 
French legal system where "[tlhe state, in effect, does not content itself with defining the 
legal conditions of citizenship, which are otherwise socially constituted: it also has the 
right and the duty to create and reinforce social cohesion and, thus, to contribute to the 
forging of citizenship." Troper, supra, at 1268. 
I" Thompson, supra note 92. 
I" John McManners, The Revolution and Its Antecedents (1774-94), in FRANCE: 
GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY, supra note 92, at 177. 
16' See Martin Arnold, supra note 157 ("It is not secularism that stops them asking about 
ethnicity, it is their claim that everyone is equal under the republic, but that is obviously 
not true. French society is xenophobic; it only recognizes things that resemble it.") 
'" GRANRUT, supra note 95, at 31. 
Im Guy De Lusignan, Global Migration and European Integration, 2 m. J. GLOBAL EGAL 
STUD. 179,183 (1994). 
Heinonline - -  39 U . C .  Davis L. Rev. 1 1 5 4  2 0 0 5 - 2 0 0 6  
and ~unisia."~ France pursued a policy of integration with limited 
success. This migration has led to an increase in the number of Muslims 
living in France, making Islam France's second religion after Catholicism 
since 1989.17' Most of France is Roman Catholic (83%-88%) with a 
growing Muslim population currently estimated to be 5%-10% of the 
French population.'" French Muslims' North African origins render it 
difficult to distinguish religious discrimination from racial and ethnic 
discrimination. 
Yet, these numbers are estimates, precisely because in pursuit of lai'cite', 
France passed law Number 78-17 of January 6, 1978, restricting the 
official record keeping of racial and ethnic data.'" France enacted this 
law due to past abuses in collecting ethnic data by government 
0fficia1s.l~~ France decided to make race invisible - to not accept the 
collection of data about race and religion. Yet this deliberate invisibility 
makes targeted programs to counter socio-economic exclusion 
impossible. 
Lai'cite' underlies France's rejection of affirmative action. Affirmative 
action, or positive action as it is known in Europe, allows for the 
"preferential treatment of certain groups to make up for historical 
wrongs or traditional discrimination against them."'75 France "purports 
an identity-neutral vision of equality, and does not employ overt 
measures of positive or affirmative action in favor of ethnic, racial or 
religious The concept of a meritocracy relies on making 
opportunities available to all, regardless of group,'n although it remains 
l m  JONATHAN LAURENCE, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE NEW FRENCH MINOW POLITICS 
(2003). 
'I Gunn, supra note 164, at 456 (2004); see also Max Beloff, The Fourth Republic (1945-55), 
in FRANCE: GOVERNMENT AND SocEn, supra note 92, at 272. 
CIA, THE WORLD FACT BOOK, FRANCE, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/geos/fr.html#People (last visited Jan. 27,2006). 
LAURENCE, supra note 170; see also Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6,1978, Journal Officiel de la 
Republique Francaise U.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan 24, 1978, p. 227, available at 
http:/ /www.legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/PPEAU.htm. 
174 LAURENCE, supra note 170. 
Id. at 332. 
Daniela Caruso, Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European Union 
After the New Equality Directives, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 331,366 (2003). 
'" Thompson, supra note 92, at 210. As a result of this equality principle, several 
advancements have been made for women and religious minorities in public employment. 
Equality in admission is one aspect of equality in public service. The Conseil upheld the 
structure of one in five posts in the higher civil service to go to applicants not drawn from 
the ENA (national civil service college) because the different admissions procedure 
coincided with different kinds of talents. Id. 
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open to question whether this applies to non- citizen^."^ Despite this, 
diverse voices such as conservative politician Nicolas Sarkozy and 
advocates from the North African community have come out in favor of 
positive action to integrate Muslims into French society.'79 Although 
Sarkozy's proposal was greeted with indifference or rejection by most of 
the political spectrum,'s0 it may draw new attention after the French riots 
of 2005 and the previous passage of the "Headscarf Law," which bans 
the wearing of ostentatious religious symbols in public schools.'81 
3. Passage of the Headscarf Law 
Quite the opposite of Parity for women, and consistent with France's 
heretofore rejection of "positive action," the Headscarf Law attempts to 
erase ethnic and religious differences, rather than recognize them. This 
law is an effort to merge the constitutional principle of lai'cite' with a 
contemporary French society.ls2 
In 2004, the French National Assembly passed "legislation that would 
ban the wearing of an Islamic headscarf, or any other conspicuous 
religious symbol, within French public schools."'83 Small symbols of 
religion would still be permitted, but larger symbols, such as the Islamic 
headscarf and large crosses, would no longer be permissible in public 
schools because they set children apart from each other.'% The Conseil 
d'Etat reinforced this belief by stating that "wearing the religious garb in 
a school is not in itself incompatible with the principle of lai'cite', but must 
not constitute an act of pressure provocation, proselytism, or 
propaganda' that impinges on the freedom of the other students or 
17& The Fifth Republic of France has had much debate on whether to grant equality the 
status of a constitutional provision. The French conception of equality is both limited and 
formal: formal equality requires the equal application of a rule, but not an equality of 
outcomes. Although some differences such as those between citizens and foreigners may 
exist, the state may not differentiate between individuals as regarding human rights. Id. at 
211. 
179 For a discussion of Sarkozy's proposals see Elaine Sciolino, French Oficial Looks in 
His Mirror and Sees Future President, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,2003, at A3. 
I" Michael Wells, International Norms in Constitutional Law, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
429,435 (2004). 
18' See Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise 
0.0.1 [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17,2004, p. 5190, available at http://www.legifrance. 
gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheExperteJorf.jsp (retrieve text by law number); Caruso, supra 
note 176, at 370. 
REGIS DEBRAY, CE QUE NOUS VOILE LE VOILE: LA REPUBLIQUE ET LE SACRE (2004). 
Bello, supra note 2, at 581. The law was passed on February 10,2004. Id. 
Commentary to Law No. 2004-228 of March 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la 
Republique Francaise 0.0.1 [Official Gazette of France], March 17,2004, p. 5190. 
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impedes the school's educational mission."'85 This ruling limited the 
application of the law and resulting punishment to those girls who were 
not promoting their religion or "troubling public order." 
Deeply rooted in France's history is the strong belief that the 
educational system is one of the main places to apply the concept of 
lai'citt and ensure that the young population of France is educated about 
it.lB6 In fact, during France's colonial period, early in the twentieth 
century, Algerian children were taught in public schools of "our 
ancestors the Gauls." It is in the public school system, a key democratic 
acquisition of the French Revolution, that children become citizens. 
Lai'citt, it is held, protects the youth of the country from the harmful 
influences of divisiveness? permitting them to be themsel~es.'~~ 
Although arguments were made that this law violates individual 
religious freedom, the National Assembly determined that banning large 
religious symbols in public schools fostered the educational purpose of 
the school by promoting equality instead of religious division. The law 
only bans large religious symbols from schools, but persons can still feel 
free to wear religious symbols in the metro systems, cybercafks, 
supermarkets, movie theaters, and all other public places.'8g 
Furthermore, students may still express their views through writings 
and free speech while at school, so long as others are not harmed by the 
language used.lgO 
Many criticisms of the law have arisen, particularly from a religious 
liberty perspective siinilar to freedom of religion arguments in the 
United States. In addition, critics argue that the law encourages gender 
inequality - because only girls wear the Islamic headscarf, this law 
affects them to a greater degree than it does their male co~nter~arts. '~ '  In 
Bello, supra note 2, at 611 (quoting Conseil d'Etat, Assemblee generale (Section de 
l'interieur), § 1, Nov. 27, 1989, available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/rappor/ 
index-r.a-cg03-0l.shbnl). 
Is6 Discotirs Chirac Loi Lai'citP, supra note 164; see also Elisa T.  Beller, The Headscarf Affair: 
The Conseil D'etat on the Role of Religion and Culture in French Society, 39 TEX. INT'L L. J. 581, 
593 (2004). 
I" Discours Chirac Loi Lai'citP, supra note 164. 
Is8 Commentary to Law No. 2004-228 of March 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la 
Republique Francaise U.O.] [Official Gazette of France], March 17,2004, p. 5190, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheExperteJorf.jsp (retrieve text by law 
number); Legifrance, Dossiers Legislatifs, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/h~/actualite/ 
actualite~legislative/liensbaselegifran~e/MENX0400001L.htm (last visited Nov. 29,2005). 
I" DEBRAY, supra note 182, at 21. 
Id. at 22. 
19' See also Jane Kramer, Taking the Veil: How France's Public Schools Became the 
Battleground in a Culture War, NEW YORKER, Nov. 22,2004, at 58,68 ("There has been a good 
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fact, a number of girls have been expelled from school for wearing an 
Islamic headscarf, and are not allowed to return until they agree to 
remove the headscarf during school hours.'92 French government 
officials counter this allegation, claiming that the banning of large 
religious symbols, especially the Islamic headscarf, can help develop 
women's rights, since most Islamic women are forced by their families, 
particularly the men in their families, to wear the head~carf.'~~ 
Regardless of whether the Headscarf Law victimizes or protects women, 
it certainly restricts public expression of religious identity.'" 
Lai'citkl and its place within universalism, never arose as an issue 
within the debate over Parity. Yet Parity has deeply impacted the 
understanding of the meaning of French universalism, transforming it 
into a gendered universalism. 
C. Parity and Universalism: The Feminist Dzfference Debate 
Parity originally aroused critiques that it violated France's universalist 
doctrine. In response, feminists had to convince the French that Parity 
would not violate this Universalism. They argued in favor of an 
understanding of "the duality of the human instead of the difference of 
the sexes."'95 This effort succeeded in transforming French constitutional 
culture. The persuasiveness of the advocates' arguments about the 
nature and benefit of women politicians representing women and the 
dissemination of the issue to mass culture, points to the sea of change in 
deal of discussion about the veil law among women who consider themselves to be strong 
French feminists."). See generally Beller, supra note 186, at 612 ("[RJeligious apparel could 
also be banned from a school if it impeded the school's perceived ability to impart French 
culture or the idea of gender equality to the wearer of the scarf herself. Under the 2004 
headscarf legislation, the prohibition of 'ostentatious' religious symbols provides a new 
space for challenges to the general rule."). 
lq2 Gunn, supra note 164, at 454-55; see also Kramer, supra note 191, at 71; Bello supra note 
2, at 619 ("[Tlhe students' refusal to remove their scarves constituted an interference with 
the normal functioning of their education, a disruptive violation of the school's order. The 
girls' expulsion was upheld."). 
'* Gunn, supra note 164, at 469-70 ("It is, of course, possible that many Muslim girls in 
France are, as the Commission suggests, coerced into wearing headscarves. We can also 
imagine the very real possibility that some are threatened with bodily harm if they do not 
conform to family or community wishes."); see also Kramer, supra note 191, at 71 (quoting 
Ghislaine Hudson, who sat on the Stasi Commission ("'Muslim girls should be given the 
choice to free young women. And the law was aimed at protecting the minds of those 
girls'. In some ways it protects more. For girls, the burden of choosing not to veil is gone, 
too, and with it the fear of punishment at home.")). 
'" Indeed, when viewing the Headscarf Law from an American perspective, a First 
Amendment claim comes to mind. 
Scott, supra note 23, at 42. 
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French political thought regarding the issue of sexual difference. 
Feminists succeeded in linking women's right to representation to the 
functioning of French democracy itself. 
Parity engendered a deep and lively debate among the practitioners of 
French legal culture. French feminist assertions of women's difference 
from men provided a point of departure for attempting democratic 
innovation, presuming women's difference and molding the electoral 
system around that difference. 
Deeper inspection of debate over Parity among diverse advocates, 
intellectuals, and politicians, reveals several elements of French legal 
culture. First, it is a legal culture immersed in a concern both for gender 
equality and a consciousness of democratic innovation. Second, in the 
context of that culture, the debate over Parity has involved the tension, 
establishment, and interaction between the universalist basis for French 
democracy and feminist theories of difference. 
1. Universalism's Rejection of Quotas 
The debate over Parity reveals tension and shifting opposition 
between the French tradition of universalism and the growing 
acceptance of theories of women's difference asserted by French feminist 
theory. 
Parity, many critics alleged, violated the fundamental principle of 
universalism. An earlier attempt to institute a 25% floor for women's 
representation was rejected by the Constitutional Council in 1982.'~~ 
France's highest court in such matters declared such quotas invalid. The 
Constitutional Council normally reviews legislation only when 
requested to do so by the legislature. Here, the Constitutional Council 
seized on the opportunity of this quota law, without a request for its 
intervention, to invalidate the bill.'97 Although as a Civil Law country,198 
precedent is not law in France, the nature of the rejection by the 
Constitutional Council prompted advocates to seek versions of the quota 
law that would survive consideration by the Constitutional Council. 
The Constitutional Council's substantive rejection of the quota law 
centered on the violation of the principle of equality in Article 6 of the 
'% Gisele Halirni authored the proposed quota. Fran~oise Gaspard, a leading 
proponent of Parity, has argued that the Socialist Party, then in power, purposely allowed 
the bill to advance, anticipating its rejection by the Constitutional Council. 
GASPARD ET AL., supra note 79, at 140. 
I" ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 91, at 207. 
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Declaration of the Rights of Man and the citizen.lg9 This is because 
equality does not require that "different people be treated differently," it 
is just a concept "used essentially to designate prohibited grounds for 
differentiating between citizens with regard to the provisions of the 
law."200 The Council referred to Article 3 of the Constitution and Article 
6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the ~itizen.~" The former 
provision prevents a section of the people from exercising the democratic 
rights that belong to all. The latter provision states: "all citizens are 
equally eligible for all public functions, posts, and appointments, 
according to their ability and with no distinction other than their 
qualities and their  talent^.""^ Viewed from a certain angle, Parity in a 
sense discriminated among people for public posts, violating the 
universalism of the Declaration. As one commentator stated, referring to 
Parity, "[tlhis sort of social corporatism would break the unity of 
universal suffrage."203 The 1982 Constitutional Court ruling defeated 
quotas in the short term, but the flourishing of feminist theory in France 
fed reconsideration of the relationship between gender and universalism. 
2. Feminist Theories: Women's Difference 
Feminists have long debated theories of difference. Since the 1970s, 
French feminist theory, led by Helene Cixous, Julia Kristeva, and Luce 
Irigaray, has delved into issues of women's difference from men.2" Of 
Id. In 1982, the Constitutional Council ruled unconstitutional a proposed 
amendment requiring that no more than 75% of candidates on any list be of the same sex. 
The basis for this decision was Article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen and Article 3 of the Constitution. Article 6 states that all citizens are equally 
qualified for positions based on their ability and talent. The Council thus held that "all 
citizens have an equal right to stand for election, and that it is unconstitutional to divide 
voters or candidates into categories." Id. 
JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 201 (1992). 
20' DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN art. VI (Fr. 1789) [hereinafter 
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN]. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen was adopted on August 26, 1789 by the French National Assembly. An English 
translation is reproduced by the Avalon Project at Yale Law School. See 
http://www.yale.edu/ lawweb/avalon/rightsof.htm (last visited Oct. 12,2005). 
202 Id. 
l o  GEORGE VEDEL, POLITIQUE DES SEXES (2001), cited in GRANRUT, supra note 95, at 31; see 
also Thompson, supra note 92, at 210. Voting is another area where equality is crucial and 
often debated. One early case dealt with questions about the size and composition of 
constituencies that still concern people today. This section describes the Conseil's approach 
to equality on electoral boundaries and the process of prohibiting irrelevant discrimination, 
while at the same time respecting relevant differences. The main objective is to create a 
rational relationship between voting procedures and the right to vote. Id. 
2W Note that other strands of feminist theory, including equality feminism, are similar 
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the three, Irigaray developed the most explicitly political examination of 
women's position in society. In that sense, although no particular 
philosopher or political theorist has dominated the debate on Parity in 
France, Irigaray's philosophy most closely approaches the theories 
espoused by the Parity movement. Early on, her philosophy emphasized 
the fundamental difference between women and men. One of her most 
well known works, This Sex Which Is Not 0neIzo5 explored the social 
meaning of women's biological difference from men. As men are 
unitary, women are multiple, Irigaray argued, even down to their 
genitalia.206 Women's multiplicity puts them in the social position of 
focusing on relational behavior. Irigaray explored how women's 
language expressed this relationship-centered existence, in which 
women constantly relate to others, consistently referring to their 
interlocutors. 
With regard to women's political role in society, Irigaray has argued 
that women, as metaphysically distinct from men, have the right to 
citizenship which reflects their own e~istence."~ A certain number of 
French feminists disagreed with this "difference" theory, espousing 
instead the theory that women have the right to "equal" treatment.208 
Other Parity advocates agreed with this position and advocated for 
Parity based on this assertion. Humanity is made up of women and 
men, advocates argued, and should be represented by a government 
reflecting this difference:'09 
Together, women and men combine to define and perpetuate the 
species. Together, they should combine in equal numbers to 
organize communal life. . . not in the name of the difference of one 
sex in relation to the other, but in the name of their dual 
participation in the human race.'I0 
Difference feminists' support for Parity presaged broader political 
aspirations. As Luce Irigaray argued: 
to many United States feminist theories including: difference feminism, universalist 
difference feminism, and critical feminism. ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 91, at 118-20. 
This piece focuses on universalist difference feminism and critical feminism. 
LUCE IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH IS NOT ONE (Catherine Porter trans., Cornell 
University Press 1985) (1977). 
206 Id. at 23. 
l'" See Luce Irigaray, L'ldentite Feminine: Biologie ou Conditionnement Social?, in GISELE 
HALIMI, FEMMES: MOITIE DE LA TERRE MOlTIE DU POWOIR 101 (1994). 
ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 91, at 218-19. 
lrn Id. 
210 GASPARD ET AL., supra note 79, at 2, cited in ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 91, at 219. 
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[tlhis right to a civil majority should be universal - on the 
condition of remembering that the universal is two, feminine 
and masculine . . . . This right to a civil majority requires a 
reworking of the codes of civility, of citizenship, the Civil Code, 
the Penal Code, the Charter of the Rights of Man; it requires the 
rethinking of the borders between natural law and civil law.'ll 
Parity, such advocates argued, would reform the political system to 
reflect the fundamental difference between women and men. 
3. Difference Though Universalism 
This vision of women as fundamentally different from men, and as 
deserving separate representation based on that difference, seems to 
undermine the universalism that sits at the center of French democratic 
theory. However, Parity advocates began to emphasize that humanity 
was dual, instead of focusing on sex differen~es.~'~ Franqoise Gaspard 
led a discussion that established women's differences by redefining the 
universal itself.'13 
Central to this theory was the critique of the universal as 
fundamentally male. As one Parity advocate argued: "the universalism 
of the rights of man, sexless, becomes very quickly the moment to 
valorize the ri hts of the virile man, while pretending that it's about all !2 
of humanity." l4 Another stated: "It is paradoxical, but interesting to 
argue, that it was universalism that best maintained the sexualization of 
power, and that Parity attempts, by contrast, to desexualize power by 
extending it to both sexes. Parity would thus be the true 
universalism. "215 The universal individual was man and woman."'16 
These Parity advocates argued that a universalism that ignores gender 
difference is a false universalism. Gaspard characterized the Parity 
movement as "not a declaration of war by one sex against another. It is, 
on the contrary, a gesture toward the establishment of a true dialogue 
between [male] citizens and [female]  citizen^."^" Gaspard's vision of 
2" Irigaray, supra note 207, at 107-08. 
112 Scott, supra note 23, at 42. 
213 Interview with Fran~oise Gaspard, supra note 102. 
2" Elizabeth Sledziewski, Rapport sur les ideaux democratiques et les droits des femmes, in 
JANINE Mossuz-LAVAU, FEMMES/HOMMES POUR LA PARITE 67 (1998). Note that 
Sledziewski generally supported an exclusively difference-based theory for Parity, unlike 
Gaspard. 
"5 Francoise Collin, Projets Feminists 103, cited in Scott, supra note 23, at 42. 
li6 Id. 
1' GASPARD ET AL., supra note 79, at 181. Gaspard expressed some concern about the 
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Parity reflects incorporating gender into the universalist 
constitutionalism of France without adhering to the radical essentialism 
of feminists such as Irigaray. 
The practical establishment of Parity as an element of French 
universalism arose as feminists shifted from a quota requirement of one- 
fifth or one-quarter of candidates to the fifty percent Parity proposal. In 
so doing, their efforts reflected respect of the universalism underlying 
French constitutional theory. Parity, unlike quotas, was not to establish 
some minority representation, but rather to give representation to 
women. As Joan Scott has argued, the Parity effort succeeded not only 
in achieving the codification of its goals, but also redefined both French 
universalism and the feminist debate over es~entialism.~" In feminist 
theory terms, Parity de-essentialized essentialism by re-conceptualizing 
representation in terms of society's composition of men and women, 
instead of centering on the uniquely feminine identity in each woman. 
Although Parity seems to convey an essentialist structure of gender, 
culture and law, its advocates' vision of a dual universal may move 
toward de-essentializing essentialism . in the context of political 
representation as well. 
Critics of this redefined universalism alleged that it was nothing more 
than communitarianism, American style. French constitutional theory 
centers on the civic creed of universalism in contrast to the 
communitarianism prevalent in the United States, where society finds 
itself broken up into groups based on ethnicity, race, or sexual 
orientation.'19 As discussed above, increased attention to identity 
discourse challenges French efforts to depoliticize differences based on 
"republican resistance to communitariani~m."~ Feminists countered 
that women are not a group, but rather women cut across all interest 
groups and would not be a unified element in the legislature.'" In the 
end, advocates succeeded with this argument - that women are half of 
consequences of difference theory: "One can criticize the Parity law of installing, in the 
name of equality, a differentialist system of a nature that would turn against women." Id. at 
153. 
218 Scott, supra note 23, at 43. 
=I9 Id. 
220 ALLWOOD & WADIA, supra note 91, at 221; see also, Mansbridge, supra note 21, at 32 
("[Tlhe Parity movement . . . also counters the argument from French universalism with its 
cherished difference from the group-oriented politics of the United States and other 
countries."); Joan W. Scott, 'La Querelle des Femrnes' in the Late Twentieth Century, 226 NEW 
LEFT REV. 3,3-19 (1997). 
"' Scott, supra note 23, at 43. 
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the universal, and do not constitute a group that would conflict with 
French universalist traditions. 
4. French Women Without a Race? 
Despite the lofty goals of French universalism and Parity, minority 
women's identities are erased by this system that recognizes gender but 
ignores race. Minority women, as a consequence, may on1 find their 2 political voice as culturally neutral (read "French") women, with their 
racial and ethnic identity rendered invisible. Without statistics on 
minorities, it is impossible to estimate the number of minority women 
who may benefit from Parity. 
Intersectionality, the inseparability of multiple oppressed identities, 
bears a very different face in France from that in the United States, which 
focuses on race, ethnicity, and religion. Immigrant communities from 
North Africa and French West Africa carry cultural identities that 
distinguish them from many French people. Yet women from these 
backgrounds must face discrimination specific to their subject position, 
which cannot be analyzed merely from a North African perspective or 
from a woman's perspective. In France, as in the United States, because 
the intersectional experience goes well beyond the sum of 
racism/ethnocentrism and sexism, ignoring intersectionality cannot 
sufficiently address the particular manner in which minority women are 
subordinated. The deliberate invisibility of race in French officialdom 
222 In a sense, the French state's actions recall bell hooks's statement in Ain't I A 
Woman?, in which she denounced the white women's movement for universalizing white 
notions of woman, thereby erasing the existence of black women. See generally HOOKS, 
supra note 73. 
U3 Kirnberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U .  CHI. 
LEGAL F. 139, 140. Crenshaw describes the bind black women face by liberation 
movements: 
Black women are regarded either as too much like women or blacks and the 
compounded nature of their experience is absorbed into the collective 
experiences of either group or as too different, in which case black women's 
blackness or femaleness sometimes has placed their needs and perspectives at 
the margin of the feminist and black liberationist agendas. While it could be 
argued that this failure represents an absence of political will to include black 
women, I believe that it reflects an uncritical and disturbing acceptance of 
dominant ways of thinking about discrimination. 
Id. at 150. Though I quote extensively from this brilliant piece of legal scholarship, a closer 
familiarity with Crenshaw's argument would certainly enrich the reader's understanding 
of my argument. See also Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and the Failure of Recent 
Lesbian and Gay "Victories," 4 L. & SEXUALITY 83,87 (1994). 
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adds complexity to intersectionality issues in France. United States 
studies of intersectionality, while critical of the enforcement of anti- 
discrimination doctrine, at least rely on official recognition and some 
enforcement of anti-racist discrimination laws. In France, minority 
women literally count as women, but cannot count as minorities; they 
certainly do not count as minority women. 
Governed by the universalist rule of lai'citt, minority communities face 
socio-economic exclusion that, unlike women's representation, cannot be 
addressed through state action. The resolution of the Parity debate, 
provision or some electoral guarantees for women, stands in marked 
contrast with the rights of racial and ethnic minorities. 
D. Summa y: A Gendered Universalism 
Parity and lai'citt reflect a fundamentally French perspective on the 
relationship between gender, race and democracy. As Joan Scott has 
argued, Parity's construction as a response to a dual universalism 
reflects the French conception that Parity is not a quota. France's shift 
from a strict universalism to a "Parity democracy" in a short few years 
clearly illuminates how France's legal culture links democracy with 
gender, and universalism with difference. France's historical connection 
to the ideal of universalism has led to disparate results with regard to 
women's rights and minority rights. While Parity succeeded in 
establishing women's right to representation, strict interpretations of 
lai'citt have left racial, ethnic and religious minorities not only uncounted 
but also subject to restrictions of self-expression. This contrast within 
universalism leaves intersectional women aside. France's attempt to 
resolve the relationship between democracy and identity (whether 
gender, racial, ethnic or religious) proves an interesting contrast with the 
United States. The United States' undeniable under-representation of 
women and its long history of racial and ethnic subordination highlight 
the need for further inquiry. 
111. DISPARITY: WOMEN'S LACK OF REPRESENTATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Parity embodies a radically different understanding of the relationship 
between democracy and group rights. Parity poses a host of challenging 
questions for non-French legal thinkers. Other scholars have raised and 
examined questions of how government constructs impact gender 
representation. What blindspots of the United States legal system may 
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be revealed by examining Parity in a comparative framework?"* First, it 
becomes clear that the United States shares France's respect for the Law's 
neutrality with regard to group rights. As addressed in Part I, liberals 
reject quotas as violating the neutrality of the Law, while critical thinkers 
oppose quotas as fostering essentialist constructions of identity. 
Parity allows us to re-think the relationship between a neutral state 
and group rights. Can some provisions for women's representation be 
constructed to reflect the United States' profound antipathy toward 
quotas? This section will build on Parity with the concept of fluidity to 
answer both liberal and critical arguments against quotas.225 Fluidity 
already defines much United States jurisprudence on remedies for group 
inequality. Given this fluidity, some remedy for electoral gender 
inequality would fit within the context of United States neutrality. 
Reconsidering descriptive representation in the context of Parity and 
fluidity raises the prospect that quotas, particularly fluid quotas, may not 
foster essentialism or violate neutrality. Parity reflects a different, but 
not entirely foreign, iteration of a democratic response to inequality. 
A. French Universalism and United States Neutrality 
Although the democracies of the United States and France share 
temporal and philosophical origins, many French commentators draw 
sharp distinctions between France's strict adherence to universalism and 
the opposing "communitarian" style of the United States. Under this 
French view, the law of the United States reflects the jumble of groups 
that constitute the nation, respecting racial and language differences. 226 
To the contrary, the United States, as well as France, observes the 
neutrality of the law. Although not labeled as universalism, and not 
treated as such by the wider public as a civic religion the way 
universalism is in France, United States constitutional jurisprudence 
reflects a very similar value of neutrality." The general principle of 
neutrality requires that "the government may not play favorites; it must 
be impartial."228 A product of the Enlightenment, the liberal state 
radically departed from earlier social structures that distinguished 
U4 See generally ROLAND BARTHES, EMPIRE OF SIGNS (1982). 
" See generally Mansbridge, supra note 21. 
226 Id. at 32. 
" But see Martin Wolf, When Multiculturalism Is a Nonsense, FIN.  TIMES (London), Aug. 
31, 2005, at 11 (contrasting against British response to multiculturalism: "[tlhe American 
and French response to the challenge of creating the needed identities (and so identification 
with the polity) has been to create a civic creed"). 
UB Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1. 
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among people based on their birth. Universally-applied rights 
attempted to extinguish the Ancien Rigirne's inequalities. 
Centuries later, across the Atlantic, official classlessness continues as 
the centerpiece of United States democracy. As Justice O'Connor stated 
in her dissent in Metro Broadcasting, "[alt the heart of the Constitution's 
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the 
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply 
components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class."229 Treating 
individuals differently based on group identity, in that case - race - 
violates "the Nation's widely shared commitment to evaluating 
individuals upon their individual merit."m This emphasis on the 
individual neatly matches in some ways the emphasis on the citizen in 
French constitutional Finally, as quotas arouse nearly 
universal repudiation in the United States, we must recall that Parity 
advocates argued that the law was not a quota, envisioning a republic 
composed of citoyens and c i t ~ ~ e n n e s . ~ ~ ~  Thus, despite French commentary 
to the contrary, French universalism finds a close match in United States 
n e ~ t r a l i t y . ~  
As French universalism faced feminist criticism, United States 
neutrality has been criticized by some as a false justification for the 
distribution of advantages under our constitutional doctrine.234 Cass 
Sunstein questions the presumption that neutrality is fair because it 
draws on old biases and stereotypes.w The notion of "equality," 
Sunstein asserts, cannot be detached from references to old values and 
distributions because the concept is dependent upon how the 
government normally ensures equality, rather than on how it should 
ensure equality.236 The baseline of neutrality, in a constitutional context, 
must be adjusted through a substantive debate that is not reliant upon 
what is considered "nat~ral."~' Finally, Sunstein criticizes the gendered 
nature of neutrality much in the way that French feminists criticized 
229 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (quoting Az. Governing Comm. 
for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983)) 
(citations omitted). 
" Id. at 603. 
=' See DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF h h N ,  supra note 201. 
~ 3 '  OLYMPE DE GOUGES, DECLARATION DES DROlTS DE LA FEMME ET DE LA CITOYENNE 
(1791). 
233 The author thanks Sheila Foster for sharing many of these parallels. 
U" Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1-2. 
2" Id. at 2-3. 
Id. at 5-8. 
~3' Id. at 12-13. 
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universalism - as legal rules reflecting male norms that subjugate 
238 
women. 
French universalism and United States neutrality share similarities in 
their underlying philosophy as well as in their relationship to responses 
to group inequality. To suggest a theoretical framework for resolving 
this dilemma, Jane Mansbridge's theory of fluidity provides a strong 
basis for conceptualizing remedies that straddle the relationship between 
democracy and identity. 
B. Fluidity and the Anti-Essentialist Examination of Quotas 
Jane Mansbridge's work on anti-essentialist arguments for quotas 
provides useful thinking on how to incorporate lessons from Parity. 
Mansbridge advocates for the adoption of more 'fluid' remedies for 
group inequality. "Permanent quotas are both static and highly 
essentializing - they imply, for example, that any 'woman' can stand for 
all "women," any "black" for all "blacks." They do not respond well to 
constituents' many-sided and cross-cutting interests." Fluid, 
experimental remedies, grounded in historical rationales, do not foster 
essentialist notions of identity.239 
Mansbridge charts a spectrum of remedies for political 
underrepresentation from least fluid to more fluid. Less fluid remedies 
include those in constitutions instead of legislation or political party 
rules. Guaranteed seats are less fluid than guaranteed candidacies, 
which permit voters to choose.240 Such a quota, if legislated, is more 
easily revised than one in a c~nstitution.~~' Party-level quotas are still 
238 Id. at 3. Legal practices have relied on social norms to justify inequality in the 
workplace where women are discriminated against in job placement and advancement 
because of the traditional notion of women being the caretakers and men being the 
breadwinners. Id. at 16. Male physical capacities often serve as the baseline to determine 
women's treatment, instead of changing the baseline to view women in their own context. 
Id. at 3. The issue of abortion, as Sunstein argues it, concerns freedom from discrimination 
rather than a woman's right to privacy. Id. at 49. The norm is to view the situation from 
what society considers a woman's natural role, but this is a stereotype. Neutrality, 
Sunstein points out, moves biological sex differences into the legal sphere of constitutional 
rights. Id. at 49-52. 
Mansbridge, supra note 21, at 30. 
'" Note that the Parity law does not quite fit into this category as it requires political 
parties to nominate women, not that voters elect women, making Parity a substantially 
more fluid remedy. For quotas in India, see Jason Morgan-Foster, From Hutchins Hall to 
Hyderabad and Beyond: A Comparative Look at Afirmative Action in Three Jurisdictions, 9 
WASH. &LEE RACE &ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 73,87-92 (2003). 
24' This would include legislated quotas for seats in legislatures, such as India's bill to 
institute a quota for seats in the Indian Parliament. India also has a law that requires a 
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more fluid, as political parties are not official arms of the government. 242 
Mansbridge places majority-minority districts, the principal remedy in 
the VRA, in this middle area, as they encourage, but do not mandate, the 
election of members of certain groups through di~tr ict in~."~ Most fluid 
are "enabling devices," policies that encourage members of subordinated 
groups to seek office. 
Examples of "enabling devices" are schools and funding for potential 
candidates, caps and public funding of nomination campaign expenses, 
and formalized party committees to find and encourage candidates from 
disadvantaged groups. Another element, more relevant in developing 
countries than in countries with established social welfare systems, is 
daycare for public officials. Such "enabling devices," subject to context- 
related revisions, bring fluidity to remedies for group inequality, and for 
electoral gender inequality in particular.244 
Parity lacks fluidity as a permanent part of the French Constitution, 
but recovers some fluidity in requiring candidacies rather than seats.245 
Indeed, as discussed above, Parity permits voters to exhibit a preference 
for male candidates.246 In this sense, Parity provides equality of 
opportunity rather than equality of outcome. Although United States 
observers may view Parity as less fluid, as Joan Scott argues, Parity was 
not designed to accommodate a group, but to recognize the Republic's 
third of all village leaders be women. This law has been the subject of a detailed statistical 
study by Esther Duflo of M.I.T. Esther Duflo & Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Women as 
- Policy Makers: Evidencefrom a Randomized Policy Experiment in India, 72 ECONOMETMCA 1409 
(2004), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download~pdf.php?id=437. This 
would also include legislative quotas for nominations by political parties, such as Brazil's 
Lei das Cotas. 
'" These quotas are widespread, having been adopted by many progressive parties in 
Europe in the 1990s. 
'" The Voting Rights Act requires, in some instances, majority-minority districting. See 
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 9 1973 (1965); Darren Rosenblum, Geographically Sexual: 
Advancing Lesbian and Gay Interests through Proportional Representation, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 119, 140-45 (1996); see also Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45-51 (1986). She also, 
erroneously I believe, places proportional representation and cumulative voting systems 
here. Although proportional representation may provide more minority representation, 
such systems do a better job of including diverse opinions, not just identity-based 
minorities. Certain proportional systems provide greater minority representation. 
lU Mansbridge, supra note 21, at 31. . 
For example, India's bill provides for a requirement of a certain number of seats. 
Sumita Ray, The Women's Reservation Bill of India: A Political Movement Toward Equality for 
Women, 13 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 53,54 (1999). 
" Frechette et al., supra note 102, at 5-6. 
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Regardless, Parity does lack the fluidity necessary to avoid the 
essentializing consequences of quotas. 
C. Beyond the Bugaboo of Quotas: Fluidity in United States 
Remedies for Group Inequality 
Quotas, as established in Part I, are an anathema in the United States. 
According to the Supreme Court in Grutter, a "quota" means "a program 
in which a certain fixed number or proportion of opportunities are 
reserved exclusively for certain minority Quotas rigidly 
"impose a fixed number or percentage which must be attained, or which 
cannot be exceeded."249 Quotas, as Justice Powell stated in Bakke, 
"insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for 
the available seats."250 A quota such as Parity potentially violates several 
constitutional protections, not least of which is the First Amendment 
right of political parties.251 
'" It is worth noting, however, that Mansbridge dismisses the pro-Parity arguments of 
French feminists that democracy should be half female because the universal is "essentially 
binary." Mansbridge, supra note 21, at 33. 
'" Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496 (1989) (plurality opinion), quoted in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,335 (2003). 
'" Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986) (O'Comor, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part), quoted in Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335. 
250 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.), quoted in, 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335. 
Were the U.S. to institute a law that would impose gender requirements on 
candidates nominated by political parties, such a law might face a successful challenge as 
an unconstitutional intrusion into the political parties' First Amendment rights. See, e.g., 
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567,575-76 (2000). In that case, the Supreme Court 
struck down the Califomia law as an unconstitutional intrusion into the political parties' 
right to associate and stated that "[sltate interests promoting fairness, affording voters 
greater choice, increasing voter participation, and protecting privacy not sufficiently 
compelling to justify intrusion into political parties' associational rights . . . . In no area is 
the political association's right to exclude more important than in the process of selecting 
its nominee." Id. at 584; Tashjan v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224 (1986) 
(striking down Connecticut statute, section 9-431, which required voters in any political 
party primary to be registered members of that party, because statute "impermissibly 
interfered with political party's First Amendment right to define its associational 
boundaries."). In Tashjnn, the Court held that the Constitution conferred limited powers on 
states to regulate the inner workings of political parties and that "[A] State or a court, may 
not constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that of the Party. The Party's 
determination of the boundaries of its own association, and of the structure which best 
allows it to pursue its political goals, is protected by the Constitution." Id. (citation 
omitted); see also Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisc ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107,124 (1981) 
(holding that "[a] political party's choice among various ways of determining makeup of a 
state's delegation to party's national convention is protected by the constitution. . . the 
courts may not interfere on the ground that they view a particular expression of First 
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As defined in United States jurisprudence, only those "least fluid" 
remedies merit a label of "quota." Parity, which reserves candidacies for 
women, would qualify as a quota under United States jurisprudence. On 
the other hand, majority-minority districts or "enabling devices" may 
not properly merit the label quota. As addressed in Part I, the label 
"quota" itself provokes a visceral reaction, sinking any chance of 
adoption. Defining quota as including any remedy for group inequality, 
fluidity provides the most potential for considering Parity in the United 
States conte~t.~'  Parity, as a remedy for inequality, raises the question of 
how the United States balances the law's neutrality with group 
inequality remedies. 
Presenting these various remedies for underrepresentation (and 
indeed a similar spectrum could be presented for antidiscrimination 
remedies) exposes the limitations of blind opposition to quotas and other 
group inequality remedies. Fluidity also provides an analytic structure 
for assessing which groups merit consideration for differential treatment 
while maintaining an anti-essentialist awareness. In contrast, other 
scholars who have advocated quotas rely on reified subordinate 
id en ti tie^.^^ Starting from anti-essentialist theory, fluidity already 
Amendment freedoms as unwise or irrational"); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51,57 (1973) 
(holding that freedom to associate with political party of one's choice "is an integral part of 
this basic constitutional freedom"); Lisa Schnall, Comment, Party Parity: A Defense of the 
Democratic Party Equal Division Rule, 13 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 381,391-92 (2005) 
(arguing that so long as courts continue to grant political parties expansive associational 
rights, Equal Division rules, rules that guarantee women half of available slots in 
institutions, particularly political, cannot be implemented by State or Federal 
governments). 
252 This determination as to which groups merit some quota depends on a normative 
evaluation of the justifications for differential treatment. Many others have treaded on this 
debate. Mansbridge herself argues that quota remedies may be appropriate in historical 
contexts of 1) a history of communicative distrust; and, 2) uncrystallized interests. 
Mansbridge, supra note 21, at 19. Communicative distrust points to the reality that 
communication between groups "varies from group to group and from era to era . . . 
particularly if one group is historically dominant and the other historically subordinate." 
Id. at 21. In the context of such group relations, members of subordinate groups may trust 
other members of that group more than members of the "dominant" group. Mansbridge 
asserts that such communicative distrust exists between whites and blacks in the United 
States, and to a lesser extent between men and women. Id. at 22. "Uncrystallized 
interests," according to Mansbridge, exist where "citizen interests on particular issues . . . 
have not been on the political agenda long, candidates have not taken public positions on 
them, and political parties are not organized around them." Id. 
253 Alex Johnson, for example, advocates the use of quotas in higher education 
admissions on the subordination of minorities. Johnson advocates the use of quotas 
because "not much has changed with respect to the condition of minorities in our society 
and their position vis-a-vis whites," and that "the manipulation of the concept of 'merit' in 
our society" has led to a consistent subjugation of blacks. Johnson Jr., supra note 66, at 
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constitutes one of the strongest currents in United States jurisprudence 
on remedies for group inequality. 
1. United States Jurisprudence Increasingly Reflects Fluidity 
Fluidity, it may be argued, already characterizes Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on affirmative action and districting. In both areas, over 
the course of decades, the Court has established a perspective on the 
relationship between the neutrality of the state and racial identity. This 
jurisprudence has clearly indicated support for policies that emphasize a 
multiplicity of factors over hard numbers and "wooden" racial identity. 
Focusing on remedies for racial inequality in the gender context requires 
the acknowledgment that issues of race and gender arouse distinct 
debates and concerns. However, the advanced level of debate over 
affirmative action in the United States makes it the logical point of 
departure for an examination of the relationship between the neutrality 
of the state and remedies for group inequality. 
Although fluidity draws on critical theory, it answers liberal concerns 
that quotas violate the neutrality of the liberal state. Fluid remedies may 
achieve the goals set out by Bruce Ackerman and others regarding the 
institution of measures improving equality in society.254 Ackerman's 
objection to affirmative action as focusing on inequality points towards 
the need to pursue goals with consistent methods. Explicitly fluid 
remedies may remedy group inequality in specific circumstances with 
clear goals, and lack the negative effects that lead Ackerman and others 
to reject differential treatment. 
The following subpart will summarize this widely-discussed area of 
the law to demonstrate the ample parallels between current 
jurisprudence and Mansbridge's fluidity argument. It is interesting that 
1043-46. Johnson recognizes that the presumption that quotas violate the neutrality of the 
state has been used to defeat affirmative action programs. Johnson has argued that "all 
affirmative action programs, irrespective of whether quotas were or were not used, were 
initially rnischaracterized as quota programs designed to usurp white males' rights and 
jobs. Thus, notwithstanding the evidence to the contrary, the effects of affirmative action 
programs were distorted to raise the specter that sigruficant white jobs and opportunities 
would be lost unless 'quota-type or based affirmative action programs' were reigned in." 
Id. at 1059. For Johnson, the use of mandatory quotas would help rectify this situation by 
making minority representation in educational institutions proportional to representation 
in society as a whole, for qualified individuals. See id. at 1044. Johnson's more traditional 
pro-quota argument would benefit from Mansbridge's fluidity point, that the potential ill 
effects of quotas may be mitigated through the fluidity in remedies advocated by 
Mansbridge. 
See, e.g., ACKERMAN & ALSTOT~, supra note 58. 
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fluidity, an anti-essentialist argument arising from critical theory, can be 
described as defining recent United States jurisprudence on balancing 
neutrality and remedies for group inequality. 
2. Fluidity in Race-Conscious Districting 
Districting cases since the early 1990s have attempted to define what 
constitutionally acceptable race-consciousness looks like. In Shaw v. 
~ e n o ?  the Supreme Court initiated a line of cases in which it began to 
limit, some say drastically, the level of race-consciousness a state may 
employ in drawing In Shaw, the Court held that a black- 
majority North Carolina district violated the constitutional rights of the 
district's voters, who were forced to be part of a voting district plainly 
designed to be a black majority district. Justice O'Connor characterized 
the dilemma as one in which blacks had to suffer the "stigma" of being 
part of a district designed by race-conscious legislators to provide 
representation for them."' Miller and other subsequent cases extended 
the line of Supreme Court inquiry around whether race is the 
predominant factor in district-line drawing.25s 
More recently, in Georgia v. ~shcroft? the Court substantially 
weakened section 5 of the VRA by upholding Georgia's refusal to alter 
its redistricting plan as ordered by the District Court. The decision 
broadened a State's right to preclude a plan even if it reduced minority 
voters' ability to elect their preferred representatives, as long as it 
preserved their "opportunity to participate in the political process."260 
This reasoning provoked the criticism that the Court separated 
minorities' section 5 protection from their opportunity to win elections. 
Given Georgia's history of racial discrimination, the result may "depress 
a minority group's voting strength."261 Without "the invaluable 
255 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
256 See Lani Guinier, (E)racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 109, 
109-10 (1994) [hereinafter Guinier, (E)racing Democracy]. 
" Shaw, 509 U.S. at 689 (Souter, J., dissenting) (providing an interestingly suggestive 
critique o f  the notion o f  "stigma"). Shaw also emphasized the bizarre geographic shape o f  
the voting district as a factor in  the Court's conclusion that the construction o f  the district 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. See Richard H.  Pildes & Richard G.  Nierni, Expressive 
Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After 
Shaw v.  Reno, 92 ~ C H .  L. REV. 483,483-84 (1993). 
258 Darren Rosenblum, Overcoming "Stigmas": Lesbian and Gay Districts and Black 
Electoral Empowerment, 39 HOW. L.J. 149,151,159 (1995). 
Georgia v .  Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,537 (2004). 
260 Id. 
261 Pamela Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION 
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bargaining chip" of section 5, minority voters' effective exercise of the 
franchise will be weakened.262 If section 5 remains an essential remedy 
for black underrepresentation, it bears a mark of fluidity in that its status 
is not permanent - it is up for reauthorization in 2007.'~~ Between Shaw 
and Georgia v. Ashcroft, the movement on the Court clearly has been 
toward increasingly strict adherence to, in the Court's own language, 
"colorblindness" over "race-consciousness." 
Despite this movement toward "neutrality," race-consciousness is still 
necessary and constitutional. As Peter Rubin has argued, that some level 
of race-conscious districting may be required to prevent vote 
"A properly tailored examination of the use of race in the drawing of 
electoral districts - an examination that could appropriately be 
denominated "strict" - would begin by identifying which of the 
possible risks and harms associated with the government's use of race 
are present in the context of race-conscious districting, and, more 
specifically, which of these risks and harms are present in the particular 
districting plan at issue."2ffi Instances of permissible race-consciousness 
include those where race is a factor, but not the predominant factor. 
Critics have argued that this race-consciousness balance merely waters 
down the VRA's standards and permits discrimination anew. 
A charitable interpretation of this awareness and avoidance of race in 
districting may be said to reflect some attempt at balancing the neutrality 
of the state with concerns for group inequality. Critics of the Court's 
introduction of colorblindness into the discourse after Shaw 
appropriately argue that it weakens the already balanced test used for 
district line drawing. Recoiling from "wooden" classifications, the 
Court's hardening of neutrality nonetheless reflects some level of 
fluidity. As with districting, United States jurisprudence elevates 
fluidity in remedies in the affirmative action context. 
D. Fluidity in Afirmative Action 
Districting that balances the neutrality of the state with remedies for 
racial inequality does reflect some fluidity, but the more impassioned 
L.J. 21,31 (2004). 
262 Id. at 35. But see Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its 
&n Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710,1731 (arguing that Section 5 may have succeeded in 
its purpose and that its re-authorization in 2007 may not be necessary). 
Issacharoff, supra note 262, at 1731. 
Peter J .  Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict 
Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U .  PA. L. REV. 1,32 (2000). 
'" Id. at 123. 
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discussion arises in affirmative action. This most central terrain in the 
debate over remedies for inequality lies in expanding access to education 
in a knowledge-based economy such as that of the United States. As 
many have argued, university education is the "guardian at the gate of 
our democratic ideals,"266 ensuring the maintenance of our 
"opportunarian ideals."267 Fluidity colors the direction of recent 
affirmative action cases. On June-23, 2003, the Supreme Court of the 
United States decided two parallel cases, Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. 
- 
Bollinger, involving race-conscious admission processes at the University 
of Michigan Law School and at the University of ~ i c h i ~ a n . ' ~  
To summarize these cases, in Gratz, the Office of Undergraduate 
- 
Admissions assigned a value to each of several factors, includin B performance measures as well as elements of the applicant's identity.2 
Under the earlier version of their policy, virtually all qualified African- 
American, Hispanic, and Native American applicants were granted 
admission because they were considered to be "underrepresented 
minorities" by the university.270 Over the course of the late 1990s, the 
formula changed, always accommodating some recognition of racial 
diversity.271 After being denied admission in 1995 and 1997, petitioners 
266 Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our 
Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113,113 (2003) [hereinafter Guinier, Admissions Rituals]. 
~ 6 '  E. DIGBY BALTZELL, THE PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT: ARISTOCRACY AND CASTE IN 
AMERICA 351 (1964), quoted in Guinier, Admissions Rituals, supra note 266, at 113. 
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
269 Points were assigned to each factor, totaled, and added to the applicant's Grade 
Point Average ("GPA") to yield a "GPA 2" score. When marked on a grid containing GPA 
2 scores on the vertical axis and SAT/ACT scores on the horizontal axis, applicants would 
fall into certain regions of a grid. These regions would dictate one or more steps to be 
taken. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 254. For example, placement on the grid would indicate which 
applicants should be admitted or rejected. In addition, the grid indicated when decisions 
should be delayed for further information or postponed for further consideration. See id. 
See id. at 253-54. During the period relevant to the litigation, the University changed 
its admissions guidelines several times. However, the significant factors are outlined. See 
id. at 253. 
In 1995, applicants with identical GPA 2 and SAT/ACT scores "were subject to 
different admissions outcomes based on their racial or ethnic status." Id. In 1997, 
additional factors such as "underrepresented minority status, socioeconomic disadvantage, 
or attendance at a high school with a predominantly underrepresented minority 
population" were considered. This policy resulted in Caucasian in-state applicants falling 
in one region on the grid having their applications postponed for a final decision while a 
minority applicant falling within the same cell being admitted. See id. In 1998, the 
admissions policy was again changed, this time in favor of a "selection index." Applicants 
could score a maximum of 150 points, based on a combination of the factors enumerated 
above. In addition, applicants could be awarded an additional 20 points if they were 
members of underrepresented ethnic or minority groups. See id. Students scoring between 
100 and 150 would be granted admissions, between 95 and 99 were either admitted or 
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brought suit, claiming violations of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal 
Protection In its analysis, the Supreme Court applied strict 
scrutiny to examine whether the policy used "narrowly tailored means 
that further compelling governmental interests."273 In Gratz, the Court 
rejected the undergraduate admissions policy as failing to consider each 
applicant on an individual basis.274 
In Grutter, the Court upheld the Law School's race-conscious 
admissions process because it required the review of a broad range of 
applicant materials and incorporated flexibility in assessing applicants' 
talents, experiences, and potential to contribute to classmates' learning.275 
According to written policy, Law School admission was not granted 
unless applicants were expected "to do well enough to graduate with no 
serious academic problems."276 The Law School policy did not provide 
for an automatic admission or rejection based on calculations, but rather 
took account of a variety of "'soft' ~ariables,"'~ one of which was the 
goal of achieving "diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone's 
education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its 
These two cases, following Bakke, reflect a substantial level of fluidity, 
advocating admissions programs that advance diversity through 
postponed, between 90 and 94 postponed or admitted, 75 and 89 delayed or postponed, 
and 74 or below were delayed or rejected admissions. See id. 
2n The suit was based on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,78 Stat. 252,42 U.S.C. 5 
200d, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 
257. Under that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "no State shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws." Title VI provides that "no 
person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 
273 Id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). Strict 
scrutiny is always applied in cases where race is a factor. 
17' See id. at 271. This precedent was outlined by Justice Powell in his opinion in Bakke 
where race and ethnic background considerations were permissible as "plus" factors in the 
admissions process. In accordance with Bakke, admissions systems should be flexible 
enough to consider all relevant elements of diversity. Each applicant should be considered 
as an individual capable of contributing "to the unique setting of higher education." Id. 
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,315 (2003). 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. The term "diversity," as used by the Law School, was not limited to racial and 
ethnic characteristics. See id. Race and ethnicity were, nevertheless, considered "plus" 
factors. Instead, the school focused on characteristics that would contribute to classes 
composed of students capable of continuing the tradition of Michigan graduates. See id. at 
316. 
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"individualized non-mechanical review."279 Justice OIConnor's view in 
Grutter is that an admissions program "must remain flexible enough to 
ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way 
that makes an a licant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or @' her application. This contextualized analysis avoids numerical scores 
with automatic admissions results. 
Despite the implicit recognition that admissions policies must 
necessarily pay "some attention to numbers" the Court has rejected 
numerical goals as quotas,28' because of the lack of flexibility in such 
targets.282 Justice Souter, in his dissent in Gratz, defined a quota as 
something that "'insulate[s]' all nonrninority candidates from 
competition from certain seats."283 Instead of quotas, in light of the 
rulings in Grutter and Gratz, scholars and advocacy groups have 
endorsed greater experimentation in diversity programs to evaluate 
applicants holistically and "periodically review whether race-neutral 
alternatives exist."284 
Fluidity finds substantial support in affirmative action theory. Prior to 
Grutter and Gratz, Akhil Amar and Neal Katyal argued that more recent 
considerations of affirmative action suggest fluid remedies. "Race-based 
classifications impose wooden notions of what it means to be diverse; 
racial considerations, by contrast, permit and indeed require evaluation 
2n Id. at 334. For a persuasive argument on the flexibility requirement in affirmative 
action post-Grutter, see Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to Bakke: Defining the Strict Scrutiny Test 
for Afirmative Action Policies Aimed at Achieving Diversity in the Classroom, 83 NEB. L. REV. 
631 (2005). 
280 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336. 
28' Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,323 (1978)). 
282 Id. 
2a' Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,293 (2003) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317). 
Guinier argues that after Grutter and Gratz, "the leadership in higher education 
needs to be bold." Guinier, Admissions Rituals, supra note 266, at 222; Mexican American 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) et al., Bend It, Don't End It: Affirmative 
Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan After Grutter and Gratz, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33 
(2005). As MALDEF argues, the Supreme Court ruling in Grutter overrules a Texas state 
court decision holding that the desire to obtain a diverse student body was not a 
compelling reason justifying minority school admissions using affirmative action. The 
Texas plan guaranteed placement in any Texas public university for students graduating 
high school in the top ten percent or higher. The ten percent plan has contributed to racial, 
socio-economic, and geographical diversity at Texas schools. The ten percent rule, 
however, according to MALDEF, should not be used alone; it should be combined with 
other affirmative action programs. The authors point out that minority admissions at 
Texas A & M, particularly black admissions, dropped from over 18% before the ten percent 
plan was implemented to just over 12% after implementation, despite the increasing 
number of minority graduation. Similar figures are present at other institutions across the 
state. See id. at 35. 
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of a whole person."285 Amar and Katyal contrast current, fluid standards 
with quotas, which "create the impression that minority students are 
admitted because of the seats wholly set aside for them and only them, 
and they imply that race is altogether different from other diversity 
factors in the 'normal' and 'pure' admissions Amar and 
Katyal argue that successful affirmative action programs depend on 
moving beyond "wooden" categories toward fluid re me die^."^ 
Post-Grutter scholars have followed this emphasis. As Lani Guinier 
argues: "admissions decisions are a process, not . . . a fixed point on a 
scale . . . using numbers as a source of accountability rather than 
Anti-subordination remains the goal of affirmative 
action.289 O'Connor's insistence that affirmative action remedies for 
inequality be limited to a term of twenty-five years reflects the goal of 
keeping remedies fluid so that affirmative action programs do not reify 
the same subordinated identities they intend to subvert.290 
The fluidity of United States remedies for group inequality directly 
applies to the questions raised by Parity regarding electoral gender 
inequality. 
E. Women, the Underrepresented Gender 
The United States will not adopt Parity because of the reasons in Part I, 
above, that make it such a foreign concept. In addition, as discussed 
above, Parity's provisions lack the fluidity that typifies United States 
remedies for group inequality. Parity does, however, suggest new ways 
for United States scholars to consider the balancing of neutrality and 
group inequality remedies. It also suggests that United States 
commentators consider the possibility that: 1) women may be 
underrepresented in the United States political system and that 2) this 
inequality merits a remedy. 
As stated in Part I, this Article does not seek to present a complete 
argument that electoral gender inequality should be remedied. Rather, it 
- 
285 Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1772 
(1996). 
" Id. 
287 Id. at 1776. 
7.e~ Guinier, Admissions Rituals, supra note 266, at 223. 
" Victor C. Romero, Are Filipinas Asians or Latinas?: Reclaiming the Anti-Subordination 
Objective of Equal Protection after Gmtter and Gratz, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 765 (2005). 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,311 (2003) ("We expect that 25 years from now, the 
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved 
today."). 
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argues that an appropriately fluid remedy for electoral gender inequality 
would belong within the tradition of group inequality remedies that 
coexist with neutrality principles. If it can be said that some of the 
remedies Mansbridge labels "quotas" do not violate the neutrality of the 
liberal state, as a normative question, should some remedy for electoral 
gender inequality be adopted? In addition, extending current voting 
rights structures, as some have argued"' would fail to remedy a problem 
that concerns gender and not race, which has been the focus of voting 
rights remedies. Fluidity mandates that remedies for 
underrepresentation center on the nature of the problem: gender 
inequality. 
1. Fluidity, Gender and Women's Representation 
Fluidity, as an anti-essentialist strategy, requires further investigation 
into the use of the category of women. The most common feminist 
definition of sex and gender distinguishes these terms as follows: "'sex' 
refers to the anatomical and physiological distinctions between men and 
women; 'gender,' by contrast, is used to refer to the cultural overlay on 
those anatomical and physiological  distinction^."^^^ Contemporary 
feminists use the term "gender" more widely because the broader 
dimensions of identity in society matter more than anatomical 
distinctions. Analyzing the lessons of Parity in the context of women's 
underrepresentation in the United States, it must be noted that Parity, 
and indeed much of the discussion of political inequality centers on 
"women" (implicitly referencing sex) instead of gender. Parity and 
many other remedies for electoral gender inequality rely on the gender 
binarism of women and men in the determination of representation. 
Anti-essentialists and transgender activists criticize the categories men 
and women as presuming cultural constructs to be natural realities. 
These categories actually contain a myriad of genders, formed 
genetically, biologically and cul tural ly~ with biological traits which 
include "chromosomal variables, genital and gonadal variations, 
reproductive capacities, [and] endocrinological proportions."2" In 
"' Becker, supra note 8, at 258-59. 
"* Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311. 
" See Darren Rosenblum, supra note 74, at 50546; Fausto-Sterling, supra note 1, at 20- 
21. 
STOLTENBERG, supra note 1,  at 28. Scientists generally agree that there are seven 
gender traits that constitute one: 1) Chromosomes; 2) Gonads; 3) Hormones; 4) Internal 
reproductive organs; 5) External genitalia; 6) Secondary sexual characteristics; and 7) Self 
identity. Smith, supra note 1, at 972. Fifteen years later, the New York Supreme Court of 
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addition, the existence of transgendered people makes it clear that the 
gender binarism of women and men does not accurately describe 
humanity in toto. 
Not only does Parity fail to acknowledge this complexity, but the 
principal arguments in its favor center on the duality "sexuke" of the 
polity. As a consequence, a political party could violate Parity with too 
many women candidates - Parity mandates absolute equality. 
Designed to empower women, this structure itself imposes essentialist 
notions of identity. 
Remedies for group inequality should avoid essentializing the 
purported beneficiaries by maintaining fluidity. Rather than engage a 
notion that men and women should be absolutely equal in political 
power, remedies should focus on the gendered nature of electoral power, 
as well as the attendant political and cultural exclusion of women from 
electoral power. Women's political status has been "historically 
sub~rdinate ."~~~ As such, remedies should be adopted to balance the 
power disparity focusing on women. Remedies for the gendered nature 
; of political power raise the issue of descriptive representation. 
2. Parallel Dichotomies: Revisiting Descriptive Representation 
Descriptive representation merits further examination given Parity's 
reformulation of the universal. Joan Scott's anal sis of Parity points to 
g 6  the feminist redefinition of French universalism. One can argue that 
Parity made essentialism less essentialist, by focusing on society's 
composition of men and women, instead of characteristics unique to 
each sex. 
Descriptive representation, as discussed in Part I, emphasizes the 
'mirror' nature of representation - that a legislature must mirror the 
- population in terms of certain characteristics. Descriptive 
representation, however, is not accurate at the individual level because, 
drawing on anti-essentialism, ideological differences exist within the 
categories of women and men. It cannot be said that only a woman can 
fepresent another woman, or even "women" as a class.297 Given that 
New York County used the exact formulation cited above in Maflei v. Kolaeton Industries, 
Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that pre-operative transgendered female was 
protected by New York City's sex discrimination statute as member of class of males). 
These seven variables classlfy the distinct elements of gender identity. See Fausto-Sterling, 
supra note 1, at 21 (promoting notion of multiple gender factors). 
295 Mark Stein, Constitutional Protection of Private Power, 23 QLR L. REV. 47,58 (2004). 
" Scott, supra note 23, at 43. 
297 Mansbridge, supra note 21, at 29-30. 
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descriptive representation depends on essentialism, is there a parallel 
connection between interest representation and anti-essentialism? The 
dichotomy between descriptive and interest representation parallels a 
dichotomy between essentialism and anti-essentialism. These two 
dichotomies connect. 
Taking essentialism and anti-essentialism to their logical ends with 
regard to representation proves worthwhile. Essentialist arguments 
imply "that any woman may represent women generally, regardless of 
social  difference^."^^' For a radical essentialist, only a descriptive 
representative could represent a particular Thus, essentialism's 
logical end leads us to an understanding that women cannot represent 
men and men cannot represent women, an extreme gender binarism 
indeed.300 
Anti-essentialist theory's logical end seems equally extreme. Anti- 
essentialists divorce beliefs from identity, so any particular woman 
cannot be presumed to represent any other woman, or women as a 
whole.rn1 Guaranteed candidacies or seats would achieve no greater 
likelihood of representing women.302 A radical anti-essentialist would 
assert that a Senate of one hundred men could represent women, and 
that one split between fifty women and fifty men would not necessarily 
differ from the former, all-male, If identity truly has no 
connection to ideas, no need for a remedy to inequality exists. 
As extreme as the logical end of essentialism is, that representation 
must reflect identity, arguing that identity is utterly irrelevant in 
representation is equally extreme. The cultural, rather than biological, 
construction of identity fosters wide differences within identity. 
Phenotype does not determine individual politics, but some relation 
must be present at the broader population leveL304 Although far from 
serving as perfectly reliable markers of ideas, identity has some utility. 
In cases of severe underrepresentation, numbers may play a role in 
remedying electoral gender inequality. 
298 Id. at 30. 
2W Id. at 29-30. 
Id. at 30. 
m' Id. at 29-30. 
m2 Id. Ekcker, for example, seems to advocate that women be guaranteed seats to 
represent women, without addressing the complexities of identity. 
Yn Id. 
Judith Butler has argued that agency, rather than depend on some preexistent 
identity, arises from the site of political shuggle. Judith Butler, Contingent Foundations, in 
FEMINIST CONTENTIONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE, supra note 72, at 46. 
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A strict and exclusive attention to numbers does raise the threats 
posed by essentialism. In this endeavor, we may draw on critiques of 
the theory of black electoral success. Attention to numbers of black 
representatives did not necessarily advance black  interest^.^ Where 
descriptive representation connects to tokenism, as in the race context in 
the United States, quotas may lock an entire society, the subjugated 
group included, into a presumptively fixed identity.306 Without a doubt, 
remedies for electoral gender inequality that incorporate fluidity may 
avoid the essentializing effects that have beset black representation.307 
The logical limits of essentialist and anti-essentialist theories, 
combined with the limited empirical data available, lead to the question: 
can anti-essentialism support descriptive representation? If any one 
woman cannot be assumed to represent another, can we infer that a half- 
female legislature will do any better? Further work, both theoretical and 
empirical, needs to be performed to establish a potential connection 
between anti-essentialism and descriptive representation. Helpful data 
would come from studies such as the one performed in India that 
demonstrates that women in public office do share some policy 
preferences with women in their communities.308 This suggests that, 
while an individual woman cannot be assumed to represent women 
- 
unequivocally, at a broader level, women in positions of power may 
better reflect women's preferences. 
Increasing women's representation may decrease electoral gender 
inequality. Although numbers cannot be the only marker of 
improvement, they may be an indicator of change. Quotas, used in 
sufficiently fluid contexts with the appropriate bases, need not reinforce 
essentialist identities. Some descriptive representation may be an 
'05 See, e.8.. Guinier, Tokenism, supra note 26, at 1083-88. 
J06 Id. 
Id. at 1101-53. Although Guinier does not directly argue for a concept labeled 
"fluidity," her advocacy of proportional representation exemplifies the need to depart from 
traditional concepts of identity in group inequality remedies. 
Esther Duflo and Raghabendra Chattopadhyay performed a study of the effects of 
India's Reservation Law, which requires that a third of randomly chosen Village Council 
head positions must be reserved for women. Duflo polled residents in different regions in 
India, asking men and women what policy preferences they had. To simplify Duflo's 
results, women preferred water access and men preferred roads. According to the study, 
the policy differential between women and men could not be attributed to the inexperience 
of the women or their disadvantaged social status. More significantly, the decision-maker's 
gender correlated with policy choices. Thus, where in a village, women preferred policies 
facilitating water access, women leading Village Councils had a significantly higher 
likelihood of following this preference than men did. See Duflo & Raghabendra 
Chattopadhyay, supra note 241, at 1409-40. 
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appropriate response to electoral gender inequality without 
essentializing women's role in s o ~ i e t y . ~  Some descriptive 
representation, in a fluid form, may remedy electoral gender inequality 
without violating the United States' neutrality. 
3. Beyond Antidiscrimination Toward Representation: 
Constitutional Bases for Remedying Political Inequality 
As discussed in Part I, women's political representation is an orphan, 
without support from either voting rights jurisprudence or gender 
discrimination law. After the Civil Rights Act and more expansive 
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, equal protection doctrine 
moved toward a fuller inclusion of gender discrimination in the 1970s. 
Looking at gender discrimination law as a source reveals an analogy 
between race and gender discrimination, particularly in Justice 
Breman's opinion in Frontiero. The analogy relies on the two categories' 
relation to "an immutable characteristic determined solely by accident of 
birth." Sex, like race, "fre uently bears no relation to ability to perform 9 
or contribute to society." 'O Frontiero's dependence on this analogy 
reflected the perception that constitutional history failed to provide 
adequate support for a broad proscription of gender discrimination. As 
Reva Siegal asserts, linking gender to race discrimination theory ignores 
the "ways that race and gender status regulation intersect and differ."311 
Sex discrimination doctrine is derivative of race-based claims.312 A 
firmer basis for sex discrimination doctrine would be a "synthetic" 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Nineteenth 
Amendment, one that would bring together the language of the two 
amendments.313 Both draw on separate but related histories of 
oppression and exclusion from democratic processes,314 and both share 
the remedy of bringing previously excluded groups into the citizenry. 
The historical basis for this interpretation first draws on the efforts of 
" Mansbridge argues that such remedies would be required where substantial 
communicative distrust exists between groups. Communicative distrust may exist 
between men and women, but not to the extent that it mandates more radical remedies. 
Mansbridge argues that where communicative distrust exists in combination with 
uncrystallized interests, descriptive representation may be the best alternative for 
representing subordinate groups' interests. Mansbridge, supra note 21, at 19. 
'I0 Siegel, supra note 29, at 961. 
Id. at 960. 
312 Id. at 949. 
313 Id. 
3u Id. 
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suffragists to include the franchise for women in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, then in the Fifteenth Amendment, and then in a proposed 
Sixteenth ~mendmen t .~ '~  The many historical links between the 
Fourteenth and the Nineteenth Amendments point toward the value of a 
synthetic reading. 
This synthetic interpretation fosters a strong foundation for gender 
discrimination doctrine by grounding it in the language of two separate 
amendments. By centering the doctrine in one amendment directed at 
gender, such a "synthetic" interpretation avoids the erasure of race and 
gender distinctions. Pursuant to a synthetic reading, "the Constitution 
would protect women against regulation that perpetuates traditional 
understandings of family that are inconsistent with equal citizenship in a 
democratic polity."316 
Remedies for electoral gender inequality broaden the purpose to 
Siegel's synthetic reading of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments. Despite the extension of the Nineteenth Amendment 
from the franchise to the right to hold political office, it has not yet 
served to remedy women's political representation. Equal citizenship 
should incorporate the most fundamental element of membership in a 
polity: political representation. An  electoral focus would be the most 
direct, and even obvious, heir to the history and language of the 
Nineteenth Amendment. 
In addition, the Nineteenth Amendment's language parallels that of 
the Fifteenth Amendment. In so doing, the drafters reflect, at least 
implicitly, the recognition that they were rectifying the historical mistake 
of omitting women from the Fifteenth ~ m e n d m e n t . ~ ' ~  Akhil Amar has 
'I5 Id. at 970-71. Suffragists simultaneously argued in court and to Congress that the 
Fourteenth Amendment permitted women to vote. It was only after their loss in Minor v. 
Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874), that women began to seek a separate amendment. 
Siegel, supra note 29, at 948. 
317 Akhil Reed Arnar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671,689-90 (2002). Amar states: 
To prevent this, section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment devised a new 
apportionment formula which put the word 'male' into the Constitution for the 
first time. In essence, a state that disenfranchised any of its adult male citizens 
would have its congressional apportionment and electoral college allotment 
proportionately reduced. But no state would pay any price, in Congress or in the 
electoral college, for disfranchising adult women citizens! Then came the 
Fifteenth Amendment, giving black men the vote but doing nothing for women. 
Only with the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 did 'We, the 
People,' vest women with full and equal voting rights. These later amendments, 
all the more prominent because they have not simply been hidden in the Old 
Wing, draw attention to an obvious (in retrospect) defect of the early electoral 
college: The Founding fathers' system didn't do much for the Founding mothers. 
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argued that a panoply of political rights attach to the meaning of the 
Fifteenth Amendment. He further argues that the parallel language of 
the Nineteenth Amendment carries those rights over to women's 
Since the United States encouraged the institution of a quota for 
women's representation in Iraq, it seems the current administration 
recognizes quotas as both possible and desirable. To the extent that the 
United States already has provisions that violate the neutrality of the 
state, the provisions center on remedying specific, historically 
established discrimination. Mary Becker has advocated the adoption of a 
Voting Rights Act for Women to institute quotas and other support 
me~hanisrns.~'~ Some of her proposals? such as requiring one female 
and one male senator from each state, mimic the most essentializing 
elements of Parity, ignoring crucial lessons from black electoral 
struggles. Although admirably ambitious, Becker's proposal reflects 
little of the fluidity that characterizes United States jurisprudence. In 
addition, the key provisions of the VRA, as discussed in Part I, simply 
cannot be applied to women - women's exclusion from the ballot box 
ended with the Nineteenth Amendment, and districting camot aid 
electoral gender inequality because women are not geographically 
segregated, and cannot be said to vote as a bloc. 
However, more subtle and fluid remedies may improve electoral 
gender inequality. Any of the remedies that require adoption at the 
political party level, or at the level of encouraging participation? may 
Id. 
' I B  Akhil Reed Amar, The Fifteenth Amendment and "Political Rights," 17 C A R L ~ Z O  L. 
REV. 2225,2226 (1996). Amar states: 
I would like to suggest that the best interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment 
would read it as encompassing a cluster of political rights; the Amendment 
protects not only the right to vote, but also the right to hold office, the right to be 
voted for, the right to vote in a legislature, the right to serve on a jury, and even 
the right to serve in the military. 
Id. 
'I9 Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 21,59. 
'" In Patriarchy and Inequality, Mary Becker contends that the problem is with feminism 
itself. Id. It is empty at the core and offers no values inconsistent with traditional male 
patriarchal values, which are comprised of "a social structure that is male-centered, male- 
identified, male-dominated, and which valorizes qualities narrowly defined as masculine." 
Id. at 22. Inequality for women cannot be adequately addressed by striving to attain a 
"bigger piece of the pie." Id. at 25,51-59. 
''I Note that, unlike France, the United States does not have one school that trains the 
political elite, so changing admission quotas will not necessarily achieve much, even 
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be considered fluid. The United States may wish to build on voluntary 
efforts by political parties to encourage more women  candidate^.^" Such 
provisions must draw on fluid notions of gender rather than fixed ideas 
of "womanhood" to avoid the pitfalls of essentialism. .Parity 
demonstrates that remedies for gender inequality in political 
representation can fit into a neutral state if they incorporate greater 
fluidity. This fluidity has already found its way into United States 
jurisprudence. Constitutional arguments, drawing on the Nineteenth 
Amendment and its connections to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, may provide a substantial basis for the adoption of such 
provisions.32J Fluid provisions to remedy the gendered nature of 
political power may not be as distant from current United States law as 
they appear at first blush. 
How should democracies, at a global level, relate notions of identity 
with electoral equality and fairness? Reducing electoral gender 
inequality re uires a detour through the thicket of descriptive 
9 2 4  
representation. In the United States, quotas are widely condemned, 
and gender and racial discrimination law operate in orthogonal 
dimensions. By contrast, France's Parity system is so compelling 
precisely because of its ambitious goals and mechanisms. 
Parity asserts that quotas do not necessarily - or unacceptably - 
violate the neutrality of the state. But Parity does rely upon essentialist 
ideas about the intersection of gender and electoral representation. A 
way to move beyond this impasse is provided by the anti-essentialist 
framework, with its fluidity of remedies for various permutations of 
group inequality. The incorporation of anti-essentialist fluidity would 
answer most of the liberal and conservative objections to quotas. 
Law plays a crucial role in constructing and maintaining 
subordination among identity or interest groups. It is these same 
though many United States politicians are lawyers. 
3U Schnall, supra note 251, at 385-86 (discussing party rules encouraging women's 
participation in United States political parties). 
" Amar, supra note 318, at 2226; Siegel, supra note 29, at 947-1046. 
324 Regardless of whether the answers involve some form of training or funding for 
candidates of under-represented groups or the more radical solution of guaranteeing 
candidacies, the deepening of democracy depends on exploration and experimentation. As 
the United States pursues the spread of democracy abroad, its own democratic structures 
continue to ossify. The very different pursuit of improving democracy is at the core of 
Parity's ambitions. 
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structures that effectively close our eyes to other legal systems' methods 
for accounting for and treating difference. Therefore instructive to recall 
French literary critic Roland Barthes' "semiotic travelogue" of his visit to 
~ a ~ a n . ~ ' ~  In exploring Japanese culture he observed that he learned more 
about his own culture than that of his ostensible subject, Japan. Given the 
"disarray"326 of comparative legal scholarship, his insight is worth 
remembering. A comparative approach exposes blind spots in the 
United States' legal culture, and the positive, concrete effects of such 
scholarship could transform the approach of the United States to 
327 
universalism, difference, neutrality and equality. The democracy of 
the United States could be all the better for it. 
'" BARTHES, supra note 224. 
326 See generally Catherine A. Rogers, Gulliver's Troubled Travels, or the Conundrum of 
Comparative Law, 67 GEO. WASH. L REV. 149 (1998). 
327 Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence v .  Texas points to the value of a comparative 
perspective. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,573,576 (2003). 
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